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UKRAINE'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?

by

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December 2002

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**UKRAINE'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA:
COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

Independent since 1991, Ukraine continues to struggle to improve its political stability and economic strength. Because of Ukraine's geographic proximity to and intertwined history with Russia, Ukrainian leaders measure their actions against the interests of Russia. Ukrainian policies, especially those that would expose Ukraine to Western influences and those independent of Russia's approval, could cause distrust in Moscow. Because Ukraine is likely to make political decisions that may cross Russian interests, the thesis will answer the questions: should Ukraine adopt a competitive or cooperative policy with Russia, or some combination of both, in order to fulfill its national security goals? The thesis formulates an analytical framework that assesses the feasibility and rationality of possible Ukrainian decisions on two volatile issues: the energy supply imbalance and border demarcation. It incorporates the domestic influences in Ukraine and Russia, as well as dominant international factors, in its analysis, seeking to identify the internal biases of the decision makers and how those biases affect the strength and security of an independent Ukraine. This thesis concludes by recommending steps that Ukraine and the United States could take to ensure Ukrainian sovereignty in the future.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THESIS OVERVIEW

In the mid-1990s, during the debate concerning the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet, a joke was overheard on the streets of Sevastopol: A Russian and a Ukrainian find \$1,000 on the street. The Russian turns to his buddy and says, “Let’s split it like brothers!” The Ukrainian shakes his head and responds, “No thanks. Let’s split it 50-50.”¹ So goes the “big brother, little brother” relationship between Ukraine and Russia. For many people in Ukraine, far too many years have passed in which Russia played the patronizing role, often with brutal effects, in its relations with Ukraine. Keeping this historical relationship in mind, this thesis poses the question of how Ukraine can solidify its existence as an independent member of the world community without deepening or getting locked into its traditional frictions with Russia.

Given the long history of difficult relations between the two nations, the future strength and independence of Ukraine could clash with Russia’s inherent interests. No other international relationship embodies the expression “familiarity breeds discontent” better than the Ukrainian – Russian situation. Since this familiarity exists, the stronger and larger Russia can intimidate Ukraine to comply with Russian interests. Prior to the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine embarked upon a course of independence that requires it to become more self-sufficient and able to reject overt threats from Russia.

Independent since 1991, Ukraine continues to struggle in its efforts to improve its political stability and economy. Because of its history with Russia, Ukrainian leaders measure their actions against the domestic and foreign interests of Russia. Policies taken by Ukraine, especially those that would expose Ukraine to Western influences and those independent of Russia’s approval, may cause distrust and suspicion in Moscow. In the future, Ukraine is likely to make numerous political decisions that may cross Russian interests. By exploring these possibilities and problems, the thesis will answer the

¹ Tyler Felgenhauer, “Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords,” Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, February 1999. Accessed online 27 August 2002, <<http://www.wilson.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/ukraine.html>>.

questions: should Ukraine adopt a competitive or cooperative policy with Russia, or some combination of both, in order to fulfill its national security goals? And, if it seeks to combine the two, how can it best do so?

The United States and the West also are interested in the strength and sovereignty of Ukraine. Not only does the West desire to promote the stability of Ukraine, but it also would like Russia to continue to move toward non-threatening conduct toward Ukraine. Richard Murphy stated in the summer of 1999:

What happens in Ukraine will have an impact one way or another on Europe's peace and stability. If Ukraine stays the course toward democracy and free markets with the attendant benefits for ordinary Ukrainians, this can have a beneficial influence on the political development of Russia. When Russia sees that Ukraine is strengthening its independent statehood, the dream of restoration of the empire will fade among the Russian political elite.²

Most political and economic bodies in Ukraine, Russia, and the West readily acknowledge that Russia bargains with a stronger hand. Over the last decade, a number of accords that included Russia as the regional power have been skewed in Moscow's favor. The Russian extraction of Ukraine's tactical nuclear warheads in 1992 proved advantageous to Moscow. The subsequent difficulty in achieving an accord over the disposition of the strategic nuclear forces required diplomatic intervention on the part of the United States because Kiev did not trust Moscow to follow through on strict bi-lateral agreements. Ukraine also concluded, even prior to releasing all of its tactical nuclear weapons, that it should receive something for surrendering its tactical and strategic nuclear weaponry. Subsequent negotiations with Russia on the disposition and control of the Black Sea Fleet caused sizable rifts between the two states as well as domestic intrigue in both countries. Throughout most negotiations since 1991, the willingness of Moscow to inject energy asset management, i.e. to either stop the flow of gas exports to Ukraine or to change the agreed compensation for Ukrainian debts has usually forced Ukraine to accept a weaker outcome than Russia.

² Richard W. Murphy, "Ukraine In Europe," The Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 1999, p. 8. Accessed online, <<http://www.csis.org/europe/pubs/UkraineInEurope.pdf>>.

The thesis also addresses several other questions: What does Ukraine need to change to improve its political and economic strength and are these changes institutional or constitutional in nature? Do any of the necessary changes violate the official policy interests or domestic well being of Russia? Could economic and political differences between the two nations escalate to undesired military consequences? What are the Western interests in Ukraine and how can the West best assuage Russian concerns about Ukrainian gains in political, economic, and military strength?

Western Europe and the United States provide Ukraine with politically stable, economically viable, and militarily capable models. Since the December 1991 plebiscite and Ukraine's independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Ukrainian government has taken several steps to improve its security and to establish its own independence from Russia. Not only has Ukraine attempted some social, political, and economic reforms to engender Western investment, but it also has engaged in military exercises and training with the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP). The 1990s also exemplified the positive and negative effects that the West can have when assisting the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Efforts to assist Ukraine and Russia, through trade, negotiations, military contacts, or sanctions can work to the betterment or detriment of Ukrainian strength.

Even though Ukraine has consistently stated its intentions of becoming a nation that adheres to the European conscience, the government under Leonid Kuchma has recently operated without the same sense of urgency as compared to the early-1990s. Lagging internal reforms coupled with unflattering accusations concerning the official abuse of the press (including possibly sanctioned murder) and illegal trade with rogue states has dampened Ukrainian-United States relations. Until these matters are addressed and resolved to the satisfaction of the international community and the Western powers, Ukraine will find integration into Europe to be a slow process.

Since 1991, when the international community recognized Ukrainian and Russian independence, Russia has not officially challenged Ukraine's sovereignty. However, for numerous reasons ranging from Russia's desire to maintain beneficial economic

commerce with one of its largest trading partners to Russia struggling to find its own “national identity,” Moscow has periodically made references to Russia’s duty and responsibility to maintain preeminence over the former Soviet states. In October 1993, domestic interests pushed Russian President Boris Yeltsin to reassess his stance toward Russian involvement with the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Yeltsin stated that Russian security policies should focus on protecting Russia’s vital interests – especially in the “near abroad.”³

In the fall of 2000, after receiving pressure from Russia, Ukrainian President Kuchma dismissed the “Western-oriented” Borys Tarasiuk as Foreign Minister.⁴ More recently, during the 2001 election in Ukraine, the Russian state-owned press excoriated the Ukrainian Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko, a Ukrainian-American by birth, as a sinister means of United States maintaining control over the Prime Minister and thus over Ukraine’s official functions.⁵ Though President Vladimir Putin has not made bold and abrasive comments in public, his government continues to expand Russian influence within Ukraine by allowing Russian interests to purchase commercial commodities throughout Ukraine in lieu of official Ukrainian energy debts. Unlike other vocal politicians, such as Vice-Speaker of the Russian Duma Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Putin is more sophisticated in his approach to Ukraine. He aligns himself with the ethnonationalist Russian interests, stating to the Congress of Russian Compatriots in October 2001 that Russian compatriots are “a spiritual community of different ethnic groups oriented towards Russian culture and language.”⁶ With such a stance, Moscow readily supports actions and movements within the former Soviet states that strive to establish “Russian” as an official language. Simultaneously, Putin aligns himself with

³ Dimitri Baluyev, “European Security in the 1990s: New Definition and New Institutional Frameworks,” *Eurosecurity*, Nizhniy Novgorod, 1994, accessed online 8/17/2002, <<http://www.kis.ru/~dbalu/lib/eurosec.htm>>. More recently, Russian state-owned press excoriated the Ukrainian Prime Minister Yushchenko, a Ukrainian-American by birth, as a sinister means of U.S. control over the Prime Minister and her functions. Ariel Cohen, “Crisis in Ukraine: U.S. Interests under Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, 2 May 2001. Accessed online, <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/Test050201.cfm>>.

⁴ Ariel Cohen, “Crisis in Ukraine: U.S. Interests under Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, 2 May 2001. Accessed online, <<http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/Test050201.cfm>>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Taras Kuzio, “Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy Toward the ‘Near Abroad’,” *Prism*, vol 8, issue 4, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 4/30/2002. Accessed online,

Muscovite oligarchic influences, ensuring that the domestic power brokers are sated as well.

Putin has presented himself well as an arbiter of Russian strength. Skillfully mollifying most domestic sectors through supporting Russian interests within the FSU, he has shrewdly positioned Russia to benefit from trade agreements between Russia and the states of the FSU. During the 1990s, as Ukraine looked to the West for economic and security arrangements, Russia parlayed its influence to gain equal or greater arrangements from the West as well. In May 2002, when Ukraine officially broached the subject that Kiev desired to embark upon the path toward full NATO membership, Moscow did not voice its previous concerns; rather President Putin stated, “Ukraine has its own relations with NATO.” The official change of heart may have been facilitated by Russia previously receiving its own new status at the NATO table as an almost equal partner.⁷ Though officially unopposed by Moscow, such progressive integration of Ukraine with the West causes concern in the Russian leadership. The further west that Ukraine moves, the less influence that Russia has over its historic “brother.” Determining how far Ukraine can go, while understanding the repercussions that its actions will have on the perceptions of the Russian domestic actors, is a central concern in this thesis.

Ukraine also has taken other steps to rebuff any possible intentions of Russia to reincorporate the “near-abroad” by entering alliances with other post-Soviet states. Since Ukraine shares many societal features with Russia, independent actions by Ukraine may produce objections from Moscow as well as Ukrainian internal dissent and political change. If Ukraine decides to erect military and political barriers between itself and Russia, the Russian response could be more spirited and coercive. This leads to an underlying assumption of the thesis: it would be undesirable for the West to have Ukraine and other “near-abroad” states officially reunite with a rejuvenated Russia in an empire similar to the defunct Soviet Union, especially an empire armed with nuclear weapons. In 2001, Ariel Cohen⁸ stated that the status of Ukraine “will decide the future of Russia

<http://Russia.Jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_008_004_001.htm>.

⁷ Oleg Varfolomeyev, “Ukraine Turns to NATO,” *Time Europe*, 20 June 2002. Accessed online, <<http://www.time.com/time/europe/eu/daily/0,13716,264234,00.html>>.

⁸ Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

as a democratic nation state, as opposed to a neo-imperial super-state.”⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski voiced the same thought in 1994, when he stipulated that if Russia suborns and subordinates Ukraine, Russia automatically becomes an empire. Likewise, if Ukraine were strong enough to rebuff Russian intrusions, then Russia would find it harder to hold on to any lingering dreams of an empire. Brzezinski premised Ukraine’s future strength upon whether or not Ukraine instituted massive economic reforms, the success of the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood, the integration that Ukraine would have with NATO and the West, and Ukraine’s economic and political ties to Russia.¹⁰

As the Soviet Union dissolved in the early 1990s, the West offered assistance and incentives to the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe either through admission to the European Union (EU) or to NATO. Except for the Baltic countries, the West has not presented comparable incentives to the former Soviet Republics, also known as the Newly Independent States (NIS). For strategic and economic reasons, Western governments and investors focused most of their efforts on Russian modernization, after which the West directed additional funding and integration efforts at the states of the former Soviet Union. Thus, Ukraine forged some ties with the West while having to simultaneously maintain its bonds with Russia. While straddling the political and economic fence of reforms, Ukraine has not been able to substantially improve its economic and military conditions. It must make hard choices to strengthen its posture; some are fraught with uncertainty.

Ukraine and Russia, as sovereign states, will continue to interact with each other; however, they will not do so in a vacuum. There are other strong nations, international financial institutions, and military blocs that must be accounted for as Ukraine and Russia conduct their business on the international stage. An analysis of the bilateral relationship must also include those international influences, or at least the dominant international player – the United States.

⁹Ariel Cohen, “Crisis in Ukraine: U.S. Interests under Threat.”

¹⁰Jennifer D.P. Moroney, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy on Europe’s Periphery: Globalization, Transnationalism, and the Frontier.” In *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2002, p. 61.

To frame the argument, the thesis employs a collective framework drawn mainly from the works of two international relations theorists that ascribe to the “defensive realism” school of thought -- Charles L. Glaser and Jack Snyder. The framework draws heavily from Glaser’s work with respect to decisions about a state’s defensive needs; however the thesis expands Glaser’s model to include the ramifications of decisions about economic and political needs as well. Glaser’s work focused primarily upon the effects that one state might have upon another in bilateral relations without attributing any role to other international factors. To fill this void the thesis framework incorporates international factors identified by Snyder that could influence the strength and effectiveness of a government in its pursuit of its existing foreign policy goals.

Glaser stipulates that analyses that “fail to consider political consequences [of a state’s national security strategy] risk prescribing either too much or too little military capability and, often more important, the wrong kind, which can reduce states’ security.”¹¹ In his 1992 article, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Model,” Glaser elaborates on the logic of the deterrence¹² and spiral models¹³ that are associated with the security dilemma.¹⁴ Glaser concludes that during the Cold War, the “debate over U.S. national security policy often turned on divergent beliefs about the consequences of competitive and cooperative

¹¹ Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Model,” *World Politics*, vol 44, no. 4, Center of International Studies, Johns Hopkins University Press, July 1992, p. 499.

¹² Within the realism theory of international relations, since there is no international government that sets and enforces the conduct of states, states interact in an anarchical environment. States are the primary actors and since some states are stronger than others, absent any international enforcement, the strong state can apply undue pressure for its own gain on the weaker state. The weaker state must deter the stronger state (aggressor) by showing its willingness to go to war in order to protect its security, thereby forcing the aggressor to contemplate if its aggressive actions would involve greater costs than benefits.

¹³ Within the anarchic system, states must provide for their own security. Because states “tend to assume the worst,” states cannot rest assure that other states are entirely peaceful in their intentions. As a state build arms for defense purposes, the act in itself threatens another state that, in turn, builds more weapons in response. The action-reaction cycle produces a spiral towards a possible conflict neither side wants.

¹⁴ “A central tenet of realism and the realist paradigm, the security dilemma arises from the situation of anarchy that states find themselves in. By striving to increase their own security – by following policies that enhance their military capabilities – states inadvertently make others feel less secure.” Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin Books, London, 1998, p. 494. States’ are unable to know the true intentions of other states and whether the other side is an aggressor or not. Hence, deterrence might be necessary, but it might also be counterproductive. If a state unnecessarily provokes another state, the first state could end up less secure.

military policies.”¹⁵ There were two components of the security debate: the military capabilities – what hardware and policies were needed “to deter or defeat the Soviet Union” -- and the political consequences of those military capabilities – “the effect of U.S. policy on the basic goals of the Soviet Union and on Soviet views of U.S. resolve.”¹⁶

Within Glaser’s model, there is a *defender* and there is an *adversary*.¹⁷ The adversary may have different inclinations, thus the need to expand the “basic types of states” from simply “greedy” states as found in the deterrence model and “not greedy states motivated by insecurity” as found in the spiral model.¹⁸ The model expands the number of basic types of states by determining their amount of greed, security, and misperceptions (which can lead to domestic changes in the adversary).¹⁹ By identifying the other side’s inclinations and understanding the effects the defender’s action will have on the adversary (both politically and militarily), the defender can proceed upon its national security decisions while minimizing the risk of unintended escalation. To stem adverse reactions on the part of competitors, national leaders must ensure that their stated military goals and policies are consistent with their military posture. Also required is the need to ensure that the competitor country fully understands the purpose for the military goals and policies, reducing “misperceptions” and curtailing the risk of escalation. If the national leaders are unable to reassure their competitor as to their non-threatening intentions, the competitor could experience a domestic power shift, becoming potentially more competitive or more cooperative.

If Ukrainian leaders were able to comprehend the political consequences of their actions, it would be easier for both countries to diffuse disputes and to allow Ukrainian officials to achieve political and economic success. If the Ukrainian officials are not able to anticipate the consequences of their actions, resulting domestic power shifts in Russia

¹⁵ Glaser, p. 497.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Glaser explicitly uses the terms “defender” and “adversary” within his model. For ease in reference to Glaser’s body of work, the thesis will also use the same terms fully acknowledging that the term “adversary” carries a negative connotation. The writer of the thesis states that it should not be construed that Russia is or will always be in an adversarial relationship with Ukraine.

¹⁸ Glaser, p. 503.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 514.

could make Russia unstable or more competitive and thereby endanger Ukraine's security. Moreover, when Russia experiences domestic power shifts, Ukraine would not be the only country to feel the seismic imbalance; Europe and the United States will feel the political change as well.

To assist in labeling Russia in regards to what type of intentions it has toward Ukraine and to help explain domestic politics in relation to international factors, the thesis also incorporates elements of Jack Snyder's 1989 article "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change."²⁰ Snyder posits

The direction and strength of this influence [international circumstances on domestic political coalitions] has varied, depending on (1) whether international conditions pose threats or offer inducements for international cooperation, (2) whether the already existing domestic regime is oriented toward liberal or imperial policies, [and] (3) whether that regime and its policies are strongly or weakly institutionalized.²¹

Snyder uses historical examples of previous great powers to delineate possible responses from his four different regimes: weakly institutionalized liberal regimes, strongly institutionalized liberal regimes, weakly institutionalized imperial coalitions, and strongly institutionalized imperial coalitions. The thesis uses Snyder's hypothesis to further clarify the effects that Ukrainian actions would have on the Russian domestic structure, especially in tandem with the broader international developments.

Despite that the international relations arguments cited focus on the domestic reactions of the adversary due to the military posture of the defender, the thesis expands the argument to include the military and domestic reactions of the adversary (Russia) to the political, economic, and military actions of Ukraine. Because of the close historical relationship, any hypothesis that limits itself to the military interactions between the two countries would be dismissive of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship on the whole. Thus, the thesis looks at actions and reactions to include economic and socio-political decisions as well as military.

²⁰ Jack Snyder, "International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change," *World Politics*, vol 42, issue 1, October 1989, The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-30. Accessed online through J-STOR 5 September 2002, <<http://www.jstor.org>>.

²¹ Ibid., p. 4.

The thesis identifies two situations and the national interests involved that directly impact on Ukrainian strength and sovereignty. The energy supply dispute entails economic policies while the issue surrounding the demarcation and stabilization of the international border between Ukraine and Russia entails the military policy as well as the social implications. The thesis determines which policies - competitive, cooperative, or a mixture of both -- best lead to Ukraine's increased security and stability. Additionally, the conclusions determine which policies provide the most favorable conditions for the regional prospects of the United States and NATO.

The thesis relies on the recent actions and proclamations of Ukraine and Russia to determine possible future actions. It determines probable Ukrainian military and political actions and the subsequent Russian reactions through consideration of present-day demographics, stated national interests, and viable political parties in both Russia and Ukraine. The thesis makes several assumptions about the intentions of the Ukrainian leadership: Ukraine prefers greater internal stability; Ukraine wants to maintain its current international boundaries; and Ukraine wants to improve its infrastructure and economic situation thereby enhancing the political standing of the governing elite in the view of the public. Likewise, the ruling elite in Russia desire to strengthen their internal control without further alienating Western benefactors. If the political structure of either Ukraine or Russia changes radically and thereby becomes openly authoritarian and dismissive of democratic reforms, all conclusions of this thesis could be obsolete.

B. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS

The thesis attempts to formulate feasible and rational decisions for the Ukrainian government on volatile issues, weighing the advantages and disadvantages to Ukraine that would result from Russian reactions. It factors in the domestic influences in both Ukraine and Russia in its analysis, seeking to identify the internal biases of the decision makers and how those biases affect the strength and security of an independent Ukraine.

The thesis also has significance for the International Relations community, for it amalgamates different theoretical models to assist in framing the actors and their preferences. It calculates the domestic influences, affected by historical understanding, and external causes that the actors of both nations encounter.

While focusing on the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine, the thesis also situates the Russian-Ukrainian relationship within the international economic and diplomatic system – dominated by the West - that could provide both states greater stability, wealth, and acceptance. The thesis also relies upon the general understanding that for the foreseeable future Russia will remain a nuclear power and thus will receive intended and unintended special handling from the West. Thus, when dealing with the West, it is incumbent upon Ukraine to promote bilateral relationships and diplomatic solutions that better Ukraine but not at the expense of Russia. The West, for *realpolitik* purposes, could not accept one-sided bargaining positions that favor Ukraine exclusively if those bargaining positions severely threaten Russian strategic interests, thereby resulting in severe international force escalation.

C. ORGANIZATION

Chapter II (DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIA) establishes an analytical framework for the thesis, relying heavily upon Glaser's model and Snyder's discussion of international influences. The chapter explains the theoretical sources of Glaser's model and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of Glaser's model as it applies to the Ukrainian and Russian situation. The second chapter also incorporates Snyder's understanding of international factors and how those affect domestic regimes.

Chapter III (SHARED HISTORY OF UKRAINE AND RUSSIA) details the shared past of the Ukrainians and the Russians. Starting with the contentious issue concerning the origins of the Kievan Rus, the chapter exposes the autocratic decisions and the resulting backlash during imperial and Soviet rule that invariably formed differing opinions and perceptions within the two states. It concludes with an assessment of two important issues that arose from the Soviet Union dissolution: the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the international debate concerning the control and disposition of the Ukraine's strategic nuclear weapons. Reviewing these two issues illuminates the differing attitudes and concerns of the Russians and the Ukrainians as each regime struggles with domestic influences and challenges.

The first section (Ukrainian Situation) of Chapter IV (UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN STATE OF AFFAIRS) begins with an explanation of Ukraine's geo-strategic importance in terms of its location, its abundant natural resources, and size. The existing infrastructure and industry of Ukraine, heavily dependent upon Russian support, coupled with its economic conditions, is explained. It continues with an explanation of the domestic influences of Ukraine, specifically the differences arising from Ukrainian demographics. The second section (Russian Political Projects) of Chapter III describes the current Russian leadership, Russian domestic political structure, and Russia's capabilities and willingness (or lack thereof) to improve the economic standings of the countries of the 'near-abroad.' It stipulates what 'type' of adversary Russia is per Glaser's model by identifying recent actions and policies emanating from Moscow. It identifies the Russian domestic actors, how influential those actors are within the domestic structure of Russia, and how the domestic actors might misperceive certain Ukrainian actions. It delineates two political coalitions: the ruling coalition that basically supports the sovereignty of the NIS and the opposing coalition, consisting of ethnonationalists and imperial minded communists who do not support the sanctity of the new borders.

Chapter V (TWO SITUATIONS OF CONFLICTING INTEREST) analyzes two consistently problematic situations between Ukraine and Russia. As each situation stands today, each one impinges upon Ukraine's desires and capabilities to strengthen its national identity and security goals. The thesis presents possible actions and likely reactions on the part of Ukraine and Russia. The first section (Economic Situation: Energy Supplies) looks at the availability of energy supplies that Ukraine requires to fuel its domestic industry. It proposes that Ukraine can use both competitive and cooperative measures in meeting its energy needs, however, Ukraine should invite Western investment, requiring Ukrainian reforms. The second section (Strengthening the Ukrainian-Russian Border) looks at the possible ramifications and determines that Ukraine risks an escalatory situation if it acts in a solely competitive mode. Ukraine could engender Russian support by persuading Western investment in Russia or else Ukraine could trade a "less important issue" for Russian acquiescence on the border issue.

Chapter VI (CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS) summarizes the courses of action for Ukraine in its approach to meeting its goals while assuaging Russian interests. Additionally, the thesis determines that the United States and the West will provide a critical link to the future strength and sovereignty of Ukraine, thereby preventing an emergent Russian Empire. Chapter VI concludes with suggestions for further research.

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II. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

A. INTRODUCTION

When a nation's leaders attempt to surmise possible repercussions of their actions, they can choose from a number of different methods for predicting a possible outcome. For the most part, the leadership can choose between two avenues, using either an historical analysis or a theoretical analysis.

In the historical route, the leadership can review the past decisions that they or previous leaders from their country have made in regards to a similar predicament. Or else they can look at previous decisions that other countries have made when confronting similar problem. Based on whether a previous outcome was positive or negative, they can proceed to follow the previous course or choose another. However, rarely, if ever, are the situations exactly the same. Thus, it is somewhat risky to base a national or international decision strictly upon the results of past actions. It is naïve to expect the same reoccurring reaction if a previous action garnered a positive reaction, especially in the ever-changing dynamic of international relations.

The theoretical route applies a template upon the inter-relations of states. Depending on the theory, the template emphasizes either the interactions of the states, the interactions of the domestic actors within the states, or the effects that international regimes or non-state actors have upon the state or the state's domestic actors. The presumptive position of most international relations theories is that nation-states (or other actors) interact with each other within a condition of anarchy, meaning that there is not an international government to set and enforce rules and laws. According to realism and neo-realism, the state, acting for reasons of greed or self-preservation, will take measures to improve its own position or secure its existing position in relation to other states. As states make political decisions and apply forces to ensure that their desired end-state is met, those same political decisions and application of forces produce simultaneous reactions on part of other states. This action/reaction chain of events is the basis for the "security dilemma."

This chapter begins by summarizing the underpinnings and implications of two perspectives on the security dilemma – “deterrence theory ” and the “spiral model” as explained by Robert Jervis.²² The chapter then explains Glaser’s adaptation of this model in depth, beginning with an explanation of his four different types of adversaries and their motives for expansion. It follows with an elucidation of the implications that misperceptions can have on both the adversary and the defender.

Glaser created his model using the international relationship, particularly the military actions and subsequent reactions, between the United States and the Soviet Union as his point of reference. Because his model focused upon the interactions of the two superpowers during the bi-polar system of the Cold War, Glaser did not pay heed to the effects that international players had upon the contentious relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, with the end of the Cold War and the rise in significance of the international community -- at least as it is supported by the remaining super power -- the application of Glaser’s model to Ukrainian/Russian relations requires an inclusion of the international players and how those entities factor in to the actions and reactions of the domestic actors within Ukraine and especially Russia. For this purpose, the chapter will incorporate Jack Snyder’s argument that “the international environment has often decided the fate of many states’ domestic institutions.”²³ Though taking a strong position on the domestic influence of the international factors, Snyder caveats his position by stating that international factors alone do not “directly and solely” determine domestic political developments.²⁴

Since Glaser does not take into account the international influences upon a country and its domestic actors, the author of this thesis perceives this omission as an inherent flaw of theories and models that attempt to compartmentalize different actions of a state as though none radically affects the other. However, establishing possible courses of action for Ukraine to take in regards strengthening its border between itself and Russian requires more than simple conjecture. Thus, the thesis supplements Glaser’s

²² Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and the Spiral Model,” *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, pp. 58-118.

²³ Snyder, p. 1.

²⁴ Ibid., p.3.

“political consequences of military strategy” model with Snyder’s model of international influences to assist in this endeavor.

B. THE DETERRENCE AND SPIRAL MODELS

In the future, whether purposefully or not, Ukraine will take security actions that have repercussions on the domestic politics in Russia. In 1976, in his book, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Robert Jervis argued that, despite much debate concerning different “deterrence theories and policies” of the United States in regards to the Soviet Union, the crux of the issue was how to account for Soviet intentions.²⁵ This section briefly explains two alternative theories as Jervis described them, with special attention to the differences in the types of misperceptions each theory identifies as the sources of aggressive action. The section then leads into Glaser’s argument starting with his critique of Jervis, wherein he states that any analysis which fails to fully understand the repercussions of the defender’s political actions on the adversary “risks prescribing either too much or too little military capability and, often more important, the wrong kind, which can reduce the states’ security.”²⁶

1. Deterrence Theory

Jervis uses the label “deterrence theory” to describe the strategic beliefs usually associated with “hawks” in foreign policy debates, while suggesting moderates are more likely to espouse what he calls the “spiral model.” According to Jervis, deterrence theory predicts that “great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability and resolve.”²⁷ The anarchic system, according to the assumptions behind the deterrence model leads states to seek expansion either out of greed or to improve their security. Since there is not a higher authority to enforce international laws, each state’s security capabilities are dependent upon the state itself. By default, some states will be stronger than others, creating an imbalance, which presents a great challenge to those that are weaker.

If an aggressive state desires to test a status quo power’s sovereignty and interests, the status quo power must decide upon a course of action. According to deterrence

²⁵ Jervis, p. 58.

²⁶ Glaser, p. 499.

²⁷ Jervis, p. 58.

theory, the status quo power can stop the aggressive state with a strong reaction, while by not responding at all or not emphatically enough it will invite future incursions. Inaction or weakness displayed on the part of the status quo power attracts more aggression. If the status quo power allows even a relatively minor act to go unchallenged, the aggressor will be encouraged to continue to intrude with more hostile acts, both in number and severity. The longer the status quo power remains unmoved to respond, the more difficult it will be to persuade the aggressor in the future that such aggressive acts will have negative repercussions for the aggressor. To prevent such a situation, deterrence theory holds that the status quo power “must display the ability and willingness to wage war” early in the encounter.²⁸

Deterrence theory assumes that the aggressor believes that “moderation and conciliation are apt to be taken for weakness.” If a status quo state holds this perception, seemingly reasonable concessions that might satisfy the objectives of the aggressor will not be offered by the status quo power.²⁹ Deterrence theory assumes further that “friendship cannot be won by gratuitous concessions,” leading it to dismiss any use of incentives or bribes. Though such “carrots” can stay the aggressor momentarily, when the appetite is once again charged, the status quo power will find itself in the same predicament, though this time the size of the bribe could be greater.

Deterrence theory further predicts that if the balance of power is conducive, an effective deterrent can quickly “check aggression.” Through firm resolve that is backed by capability, the defender can prove that the “combination of the high cost of a war, the low probability that the aggressor can win it, and the value the aggressor places on retaining what he has already won” make further challenges too risky for the rational aggressor.³⁰

2. Spiral Model

Jervis relates the contrasting logic of the Spiral Model to the anarchic world of international relations as well, wherein sovereign states must employ their own security measures to buttress against any present or future threat. Within the Spiral Model, there

²⁸ Jervis, p. 58.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 59.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 60.

is not an outright aggressive state that desires territorial or monetary gain from others, rather, the state situation is stable in so far as the states are content with their own territorial holding. The problem occurs when state leaders understand that anarchy allows aggression to occur and are unable to determine whether other state leaders are content with the status quo as well. Since these leaders cannot truly understand the thoughts and desires of other sovereign leaders, the defending state leaders “worry about the most implausible threats” and therefore plan for the worst.³¹

With this planning comes the inevitable need to arm the state with the capability to defeat any perceived or possible threats. Though the state acquires new weaponry for possible defensive operations, most assets can also be used for offensive operations as well. As the state moves to deploy new weaponry and update its doctrine, such actions reduce the capability, either directly or per ratio, of a neighboring or threatened state. In turn, the threatened state, not knowing the full intentions of the leaders of the first state, will develop new weapons and capabilities in sequence to match or surpass those of the first.³²

Within the paradigm, states’ leaders usually disdain war, which inherently becomes more expensive to all competing states. Because of the Spiral and the resulting arms build-up, benign incidents take on greater importance, as the competing leaders come to perceive the intentions of the others in the worst possible light. Instead of an accidental border crossing by a lost patrol, an incident is perceived by the opposing state as an aggressive probe in support of future military actions. Situations are exaggerated and accidental war is the result.

Reflecting the logic of the well-known game Prisoner’s Dilemma, Jervis writes that in the Spiral Model, “If each state pursues its narrow self-interest with a narrow conception of rationality,³³ all states will be worse off than they would be if they cooperated. Not only would cooperation lead to a higher level of total benefits – and this

³¹ Ibid., p. 62.

³² Ibid., p. 64.

³³ Though having numerous definitions within the International Relations context, the common understanding of rationality “means following the ‘minimax’ precept [wherein] one maximizes gains or minimizes losses.” Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations*, Penguin Books, London, 1998, p. 463.

is of no concern to the self-interested actor – but it would lead to each individual actor’s being better off than he would be if the relations were more conflictful.” Due to what they believe is an unnecessary escalation of weaponry, coupled with the risks of accidental war, spiral theorists desire states to show self-constraint or make concessions to the other to stop the escalation. Per the Prisoner’s Dilemma, if both sides restrain the escalation of force in a reasonable manner, neither state would gain the maximized benefits of victory through conflict. Simultaneously, neither side would risk losing everything through defeat in war, and both can avoid the costs of unnecessary conflict.³⁴

According to spiral theorists, the psychological biases of people hamper their ability to see when another group of people is different from what they believe them to be like. If Country A believes Country B to be aggressive, “behavior that others might see as neutral or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity. This cognitive rigidity reinforces the consequences of international anarchy.” Jervis adds to the argument that states do not apply this same reasoning to their own behavior. Even though Country A is arming itself with better weapons, Country A knows that such weaponry is for defensive purposes and sees itself as a peaceful country, not realizing that Country B and possibly other countries see the arming of Country A as threatening.³⁵

The psychological biases that leaders and peoples have of others and themselves leads to Jervis’s root understanding of the perceptions and misperceptions that result in international conflict.³⁶ Inherent biases of the defender against the adversary will prod the defender to expect a certain type of reaction even before the initial action occurs. Pre-conclusions about how the adversary will behave lead the defender to a policy that buttresses its own position, thereby forcing the adversary to react in a possibly hostile manner. Jervis states, “If the prophecy of hostility is thoroughly self-fulfilling, the belief that there is a high degree of real conflict will create a conflict that is no longer illusory. Overtures that earlier would have decreased tensions and cleared up misunderstandings will now be taken as signs of weakness.”³⁷ Whether deterrence successfully prevents

³⁴ Jervis, p. 67.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 68-70.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 75.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 77.

conflict or whether misunderstandings result in spiral escalation, perceptions and misperceptions of state leaders call into question when force or threat of force is useful to ensure the security of the state remains strong in international anarchy.

3. Glaser's Expansion of Jervis

Glaser, using the distinction between the deterrence and spiral models as the underpinnings of his argument, proposes a more in-depth method of analysis. He finds that the two models are “a valuable starting point but they are ultimately inadequate and confusing.”³⁸ Glaser begins by “reformulating” the different types of adversaries according to different motivations for why an adversary might want to expand its boundaries and thereby infringe upon another state. He next details the different levels of misperception that a state and its leaders might have concerning the disposition of its adversary. Glaser analyzes the influences that the misperceptions might have on the resulting state policy and actions. He focuses upon how military actions on the part of the defender interact with the domestic politics of the adversary. Depending upon how the political consequences play out in the domestic struggles within the adversary, the security dilemma of the defender could be heightened or lessened by the political reactions within the adversary.

C. TYPES OF ADVERSARY

In contrast to Jervis, Glaser categorizes a state's reasons for expansion not according to its intentions, but rather according to its motives. Where Jervis would focus solely on whether a state *is* expansionist in practice, Glaser attempts to determine the motives for *why* a state acts in ways that appear expansionist. Glaser writes, “In broad terms, a state's motives for expansion can be categorized as either non-security driven or security driven.” A state will pursue non-security expansion “to increase its wealth, territory, and/or prestige, to spread its ideology, and so forth” even though such actions are not necessary to enhance the state's security. Those states that are willing to risk relatively high costs to pursue non-security expansion are categorized as *greedy*. Those states not willing to risk suffering losses in the pursuit of non-security expansion are categorized as *not greedy*.³⁹

³⁸ Glaser, p. 499.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 501.

For those states that seek expansion for security reasons, Glaser categorizes them as either *potentially insecure* or as *always secure* in regards to having the military capabilities to defend the status quo. The “security” of the adversary state is measured in its confidence that the military can defend its possessions and interests.⁴⁰ Russia would be construed as *always secure* if it is confident that Ukraine does not harbor any designs to exceed beyond its present boundaries. Additionally, the same *always-secure* label would apply if Russia is confident that its military forces could defeat any future military intrusions on part of Ukraine and thereby maintain its domestic political structure. To avoid the security dilemma, it is important that both the defender and the adversary must be able to effectively evaluate the intentions and capabilities of the other. A strong capability to accurately assess the other’s intentions is key to being able to alleviate the security dilemma. A weak capability allows for unintended political and military decisions that exacerbate the security dilemma.

According to Glaser, the basic deterrence and spiral models account for only secure greedy states and insecure not-greedy states, respectively. However, because Glaser redefines the motivations and capabilities of states, four different adversaries are specified. With each type of adversary identified, the defender can anticipate the possible political consequences of different strategies and determine which strategy will have the desired effect on the adversary.⁴¹ See Table 1 for graphic representation of which model fits different motivations and capabilities.

Table 1. Types of Adversaries⁴²

	Greedy	Not-Greedy
Always-Secure	Deterrence Model	Ideal State
Potentially Insecure	Doubly Difficult	Spiral Model

⁴⁰ Glaser, p. 502.

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 503.

⁴² Ibid.

1. Always-Secure Greedy Adversary

The defender that confronts an *always-secure greedy adversary* should pursue two political results. First, the defender must “communicate resolve to protect its interests.” If the defender fails to show such determination, the adversary could perceive weakness on part of the defender and encourage military aggression. Second, the defender should “pursue policies that might reduce the adversary’s greediness.” If the ruling party of the adversary is intransigent in its aggressive behavior, the defender can support policies and actions that can shift the domestic balance of power within the adversary by supporting those parties, elites, or forces that favor the status quo and moderation.⁴³

Hypothetically, if Russia were an *always-secure greedy adversary*, Ukraine, from the beginning, must show to Moscow a strong determination that non-security expansion at Ukraine’s expense could result in a costly war. Secondly, Ukraine could cultivate anti-imperial or anti-expansionist sentiment within Russia proper in order to persuade Moscow that non-security expansion against Ukraine could result in domestic political upheaval in Russia.

2. Potentially Insecure Not-Greedy Adversary

The defender should choose policies that tend to diminish the other side’s insecurity. If the adversary is not posing a threat to the interests and borders of the defender, then the defender should take actions that solidify those non-threatening policies and the domestic actors in the adversary who support such policies. If the non-threatening ruling forces of the adversary are insecure in their power, they may incorrectly determine that the defender poses a threat to their state’s security. Because of this insecurity, the defender needs to reassure the adversary of its non-aggressive intentions. Policies and decisions of the defender that directly diminish any perceived threat to the adversary could help lessen the adversary’s insecurity. When taking such unilateral steps, the defender must ensure that such steps are not too drastic to invite aggression from a newly emboldened and strengthened adversary.⁴⁴

⁴³ Ibid., p. 504.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

If the rulers of Russia showed no designs of encroachment upon any of Ukraine's vital interests but were intimidated by Ukraine's international allies and strength to such a degree that they feared Russia's international standing was challenged by Ukraine's activities, Russia would be classified as a *potentially insecure not-greedy adversary*. Ukraine should then promote the survivability of the benign Russian rulers by making conciliatory moves that allow Russians to stabilize their own power.

3. Insecure Greedy Adversary

In the most dangerous scenario facing the defender, the *insecure greedy adversary* challenges the defender with two conditions that simultaneously magnify the severity of the other. To such an adversary, the potential gains of waging total war "equal the benefits of non-security expansion plus the benefits of increased security." If the leader of an insecure greedy state increases his military capabilities for future non-security expansion, the defender must, in turn, increase his military capabilities to counter the adversary. The adversary however points to the defender's force escalation and presents it as proof that the adversary is correct in its position, which thus reinforces the adversary's insecurity.⁴⁵ The presence of two bedeviling conditions causes the most concern of the four types of adversaries. Conciliatory efforts on part of the defender allows the "greedy adversary" to see weakness in the defender. A logical armed response by the defender causes greater anxiety for the "insecure adversary" and thus, continued escalation. The best strategy is therefore likely to be a careful, mixed strategy that offers reassurance but also demonstrates resolve.

4. Always Secure Not-Greedy Adversary

The most stable and non-threatening of the four adversaries, most states would classify "this type of state as an ally or friend." Political and military actions by the defender should promote the goodwill and foster the mutual understanding of each. Throughout the relationship, open communication between both states is key, especially when the defender may make escalatory military actions against a third state. The adversary (or ally in this case) must be well informed about the defender's need to increase its military posture.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 505.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

D. IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY POLICIES AND MISPERCEPTIONS

Glaser further categorizes the four different adversaries with another distinction, whether or not the adversary is *clear-sighted* or *myopic* in understanding the defender's military policies.⁴⁷ If the adversary is clear-sighted, it will correctly comprehend the actions of the defender and react accordingly. If the adversary is myopic, it will incorrectly assess the defender's actions and usually interpret those actions in the most negative and threatening light. In explaining the clear-sighted adversary, Glaser must set aside the implications of the security dilemma. He details what the political and military responses could be if the adversary fully *understood* the defender's military decisions.

But acknowledging the usual existence of the security dilemma, especially when there are competing domestic and international challenges upon the defender and the adversary, Glaser explains the implications of the dilemma and suggests valid responses to ameliorate the confusion. He analyzes what the defender's military policies should be if the adversary is not able to effectively ascertain the true meaning of the defender's actions.

Glaser separates military actions of the defender along two dimensions: offensive or defensive and unilateral or bilateral. The terminology used for "offensive" and "defensive" applies not only to the military actions that the defender takes but also what types of forces are acquired. Glaser uses the term "bilateral" to "refer to policies in which the defender uses arms control to achieve the objectives of its military policy. Bilateral policies *do not* [emphasis added] include alliances made by the defender to balance against the adversary; such alliance would be part of a unilateral policy." For an overall classification of great importance to the thesis, Glaser determines that "military policies that are offensive and unilateral are generally considered more competitive, whereas those that are defensive and rely on arms control are usually viewed as more cooperative."⁴⁸

The defender's possible decisions toward the adversary, whether they are cooperative or competitive, will help determine the severity of the security dilemma in

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 511.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 508.

which the defender and the adversary find themselves. The security dilemma decreases when the actions of the defender become clearer to the adversary since the adversary understands the reasons for the defender's military policy. The dilemma also decreases "as the effectiveness of offense declines relative to defense." In the converse situation, when the "offense/defense balance favors offense, the defender may be unable to afford defensive capabilities; an offensive strategy, however, threatens the adversary's capability to protect itself and therefore risks decreasing the adversary's security."⁴⁹

The distinction between clear-sightedness and myopia is vitally important to understanding the complex inter-relationships of the domestic players in Ukraine and Russia. If Ukraine acts to improve its own defenses against foreign attack by any state by deploying more policemen for border security, the ruling elite in Moscow could interpret such an act as reasonable and accept Ukraine's act on its face value. However, to other domestic players in Russia, possibly the ultra-nationalists or the military, the act of Kiev deploying "soldiers to the Russian border" could be interpreted as aggressive and escalatory. Depending upon the strength of the ultra-nationalists or the military bureaucracy in Russia and their ability to influence Moscow's decisions, Ukraine, by deploying internal security guards to its borders, could be inadvertently increasing its own security dilemma.

1. Clear-Sighted Adversary

Despite having the security dilemma alleviated, the defender will still take actions to improve its security. When confronting a *clear-sighted secure greedy adversary*, the defender must show that it can defend its interests and is resolute in its actions. Since the adversary can glean the truth concerning the defender's capabilities, it can also determine whether or not the defender's deterrence capabilities are valid, thus the defender must solidify its credibility at every turn. If the adversary doubts the defender's will to act in its own defense, the adversary could exploit the defender's lack of resolve. Arms control activities designed to lessen the threat of escalation would not weaken the defender's

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 508, 509.

resolve in the eyes of the adversary, as long as the force reductions did not jeopardize the defender's ability to protect itself.⁵⁰

If the defender were to confront a *clear-sighted potentially insecure not-greedy adversary*, the best policies are defensive. Arms control is useful when it leads the adversary to shift to a defensive posture, but arms control, by itself, holds no particular advantage over unilateral actions if those can persuade the adversary to pursue a defensive posture as well. The defender should avoid *optional offense* capabilities (those military capabilities that are above and beyond the required *necessary offense* capabilities and thereby endanger the interests of the insecure adversary) but must maintain the *necessary offense* capabilities to stave off any unforeseen acts of aggression and to defend the status quo. Because the line between *optional offense* and *necessary offense* is hard to define, to prevent the adversary from deriving "ambiguities" and "malign objectives," the defender should emphasize its defense capabilities.⁵¹

The defender should pursue defensive policies when it is faced with a *clear-sighted insecure greedy adversary*. By choosing defensive policies, the defender satisfies the requirements to meet clear-sighted insecure states as well as clear-sighted greedy states at the same time. The former requires defensive strategies, while against the latter the choice matters not -- either defensive or offensive strategies will suffice against the greedy adversary.⁵²

2. Myopic Adversary

If the adversary, for any reason, is unable to correctly judge the intentions of the defender, the propensity for misperception greatly increases and with it comes an exaggeration of the security dilemma. Misperceptions on the part of a state could be due to either national-level analytical capabilities or individual-level cognitive capabilities.⁵³ The spiral model of Jervis relies heavily on the psychological inability of leaders to correctly assess the true nature of an adversary. Rather than individual inabilities, Glaser explains the negative ramifications that weak state institutions have in helping the state

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 509.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 509, 510.

⁵² Ibid., p. 511.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 514.

make informed decisions regarding the actions and inclinations of another state. He acknowledges that individuals can bring biases to the decision-making process, but Glaser finds the larger fault in organizations and bureaucracies whose responsibility is to correctly assess the threat.

Included in a country's national-level evaluative capability are organizations dedicated to analyzing military and foreign policy – analytic units within the government, think tanks, and universities. Of course, the overall quality of a country's evaluation depends on the quality of the analysis produced by these organizations, but it also depends on the quality of debate both within the government and in the public arena. If certain organizations are able to gain undue influence because of their power, prestige, bargaining skill, and/or public relations skill, the country's evaluation of opposing states will tend to be biased.⁵⁴

To contest national-level misperceptions by the adversary, the defender must remain aware of the adversary's possible biases in future interactions. The defender should “expect misperceptions to be far more common than if they derived solely from cognitive failures.” If a Russian government bureaucracy, due to institutionalized bias, misperceived the intentions of Ukraine in 2001, it should be expected that, without any changes to the same bureaucracy, similar biases would surface in 2002. The defender should also look at “other indicators of misperception”, such as “public debate and the vitality and diversity of its analytic units.” And, if possible, the defender should also adopt policies that better the adversary's national-level evaluative capabilities. These opportunities, though rare in occurrence, could present themselves as low and mid-level diplomatic and military exchanges and other confidence-building measures.⁵⁵

Compared to interactions with a clear-sighted adversary, the defender's military policy towards a myopic adversary can have quite different effects because “misperceptions can intensify undesirable political consequences and narrow, or even eliminate, the defender's options for avoiding them.”⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 515.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 519.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 511.

The defender, when faced by a *myopic secure greedy adversary*, will have to pursue a more competitive policy. A lack-luster defense, in the eyes of the adversary, might encourage the adversary to strike for non-security gains against the defender. The defender's resolve must be strong and its leaders vigilant. If there is any doubt about the defender's resolve, the adversary will challenge it. For this reason, "the defender should over invest in military capabilities, deploying forces beyond those reasonably required by strictly military assessments." Such military capabilities may also favor the offense, since the defender must show that it is capable of making the adversary pay for any aggressive mistakes. The defender must also avoid arms control policies since such actions will be construed as concessions to the greedy adversary.⁵⁷

When a *myopic insecure not-greedy adversary* confronts the defender, the case favors cooperation while making competitive actions more risky. Whether the source of misperception comes from psychological or national-level failures, "the result is that the adversary is likely to infer that the threats to its capabilities reflect the defender's malign intentions rather than the defender's lack of acceptable, less threatening options." Because of the inability of the adversary to see the legitimate need of offense by the defender, the adversary's sense of insecurity is heightened. To lessen the risk, the defender should, if possible, shift to a more defensive posture. Simultaneously, the defender "might use arms control to reduce misperceptions by providing a forum for directly communicating beliefs about military doctrine and force requirements, the threatening nature of the adversary's forces, and its own willingness to make compromises and exercise restraint."⁵⁸

The final type of adversary that the defender encounters (not including an *ally*) is the *myopic insecure greedy state*, which Glaser determines is the most difficult to manage. Myopic greedy states require competitive policies while myopic insecure states require cooperative remedies, so balancing the two extremes is the difficulty. The defender must measure how much the security dilemma is affecting the responses of the

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 511, 512.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 512, 513.

adversary and whether the adversary is more focused upon non-security expansion or security.⁵⁹

One method of confronting a myopic insecure greedy state includes the acquisition and deployment of forces in a robust defense, i.e. *defense emphasis*. The defender unilaterally over invests in defensive capabilities. This defender takes this position even if it costs more than deploying offensive capabilities.⁶⁰ To deter the adversary, the defender should outspend the adversary, acquiring more than the defensive capabilities necessary to render the adversary's offensive capabilities as moot.⁶¹ Such over-spending on the defense could persuade the adversary to shift positions and assume a defense strategy and forego the offense. Glaser writes "the defender's defense emphasis encourages such a shift if it (1) corrects the adversary's leaders' misperceptions of the defender's hostility; and/or (2) reduces the political power of hard-liners within the adversary's government." The "beyond necessary" defense spending is effective only to a point, as the defender cannot indefinitely over-spend on defense.⁶²

Another method that supports the defensive strategy is *arms control*, especially when the measure is bilateral as well as verifiable and the process comes with risk. With effective arms control, both the defender and the adversary "gain" in respect to each designating fewer assets for the defense or the offense.⁶³ Prior to either side agreeing to the measure, the greedy adversary must be deterred. If the defender wants to move from unilateral defensive strategy to arms control, it must go to the bargaining table with bargaining chips, which requires the defender to acquire offensive capabilities. This acquisition of offensive capabilities to be used solely for barter could foment the adversary's misperceptions of the defender's intent.⁶⁴

Unilateral restraint is the third major method of effective defensive strategy. "By reducing its ability to defend itself, the defender also reduces the threat it poses to the

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp.513, 514.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 527.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., p. 528.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 529.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 530.

adversary.” This method is particularly desirable when offense and defense capabilities are indistinguishable and a greater or lesser mixture of either does not reduce the adversary’s insecurity. The defender accepts larger risks through unilateral restraint, more so than with defense emphasis and arms control as the latter two allow the defender to reduce the insecurity of the adversary without severely hampering its ability to defend itself.⁶⁵

The final method of handling a myopic insecure greedy state is competitive rather than cooperative. The option of *reactive offense* allows the defender to initially pursue a defensive strategy. However it maintains a reserve capability that allows the defender to shift to offense if the adversary intrudes upon the initial defensive stance. “A minimally successful policy of reactive offense teaches the adversary the futility of pursuing offense; in more successful cases, the adversary’s leaders infer that the defender lacks malign intentions, and/or the defender’s reactive policy defeats adversary hard-liners.”⁶⁶

E. SNYDER ON THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING DOMESTIC REGIMES

During the Cold War, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union determined the international situation. In their political and military dealings, the two superpowers responded mainly to each other or their own internal factors, while third parties had lesser influence. The relationship between Ukraine and Russia however, though both are great states in their own standing, does not rival the Cold War in magnitude. Taken together, both states are part of the international community and are affected, to varying degrees, by the amount of support or nonsupport that is derived from international factors. Because Glaser did not examine domestic-international interactions in detail in his model, the thesis incorporates three of Snyder’s conditions that affect domestic institutions and actors: whether international conditions favor the ruling regime or other domestic actors, the intentions of the domestic regime, and the strength the regime.⁶⁷

1. International Conditions: Threats or Inducements for International Cooperation

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 532.

⁶⁷ Snyder, p. 4.

Because the Cold War revolved around two superpowers that both adhered to different economic systems, the interplay of international economic factors was not as prevalent as it is today. Since the capitalistic United States was the economic and military hegemonic power of the West, it was also the backbone of the international economic institutions. The Soviet Union was the same power in the East, imposing a command economy, and it largely closed itself off from international economic forces and choked upon its inefficiencies.

The demise of the Soviet structure has exposed both Russia and Ukraine to the economic and diplomatic forces of the West. Since the West and its ideology won the Cold War, the economically weak states of the former Soviet Union have incorporated certain practices and policies to encourage Western investment. The rule of law, market reforms, banking reforms, constitutional adherence, voting reforms, anti-corruption measures, and press freedoms are just a few of the litany of changes that both states have been encouraged to adhere to and promote. Significant failures in one or several such reforms can severely curtail Western support of the offending country. Since the United States continues to dominate the international economic factors, the thesis will factor in how those influences constrain or motivate domestic actors within Ukraine and Russia.

2. Domestic Regime: Liberal or Imperial Policies

Depending upon the intent and the actions of a domestic ruling condition, Snyder describes the regime as an adherent to either liberal or imperial policies. A regime with a liberal orientation has “an electoral democracy with a foreign policy oriented toward mutually beneficial trade with other great powers.” An imperial regime maintains “an elite coalition formed by groups with expansionist, protectionist, or militaristic interests, pursuing a foreign policy based primarily on coercion and conquest.”⁶⁸ The international reaction to a ruling coalition’s policies can affect, either positively or negatively, that coalition’s domestic standing. Since the United States and its economic benefactors prefer stability within the international arena, any state that threatens to create instability within another peaceful state causes consternation and concern. Such apprehension and conflict can lead to the disruption of trade, the divestiture of assets, and a withdrawal of international support and funding, which could undermine a regime’s domestic support.

Both Russia and Ukraine say they have embraced democratic ideals and, to this day, are continually attempting to define and refine them to suit their national understandings and historical traditions. Some Russian political entities, however, desire to return to an imperial past, but any move in such a direction would be highly discouraged by the international community as well as the Western powers. The United States greatly prefers both states to further adopt liberal regimes and to take the necessary acts to firmly cement the democratic ideals within their societies. As a result, the United States and the West would more readily offer support to the liberal-leaning coalitions as opposed to the imperial state.

3. Domestic Regime and Policies: Strong or Weak Institutionalization

The relative strength or weakness of the domestic regime also determines the degree of influence that international factors have on the domestic political system. The more the state has experienced and incorporated liberal practices over time into its institutions, the better the chance that the domestic regime is able to promote liberal international trade policies. An effective governmental policy exists when all participants contributing to the policy understand the rules and allowances of the policy, including the rules of an established market economy.

If the regime, though liberal in its current intentions, has recently moved from long-standing imperial policies, the regime will be weak until it can practice its national intentions in a routine manner. Until all major actors in the regime accept its institutions and act according to the laws, the regime will be weak. The weak regime will need to reform itself or gain support from another regime willing to expend capital on the regime until it can institutionalize the right practices, or else the regime will fail in its liberalizing intentions and revert to another type of regime, usually a military dictatorship or an autocracy.

F. CONCLUSION

Glaser concludes by stating that the future of Europe and its desire to share continual “good relations” would be better served in a system “in which all the major

⁶⁸ Ibid.

powers emphasize defensive capabilities.”⁶⁹ His argument posits “the defender should usually pursue cooperative policies when moderates are in power [of the adversary]. The choice is less clear-cut when hard-liners are in power: the key issue is which interpretation of the defender’s motivations will prevail in the adversary’s debate. Is the defender reacting to the hard-liner’s provocation or simply pursuing threatening policies that reflect malign intentions?”⁷⁰

This chapter has extracted the pertinent points of Glaser’s model detailing the political ramifications of military actions upon different adversaries. Table 2 summarizes the responses that the defender should employ depending upon which type of adversary it faces. However, since the model did not adequately discuss the effects of international factors upon the domestic actors, the chapter also infused three factors discussed by Snyder that can have significant bearing upon any implementation of policy of change within the domestic structure in the Ukraine (the defender) or in Russia (the adversary). The thesis will apply the model to Russia at the end of the third chapter wherein it attempts to identify what type of adversary President Putin’s government presents Ukraine. The end of the third chapter also explains what type of adversaries the domestic challengers to Putin could be and whether or not such a shift in power could possibly help or hinder Ukrainian security.

In this chapter, the thesis assembled a theoretical framework that stipulates how a defender’s actions can have either positive or negative effects on its adversary. As Ukraine approaches national decisions that tread on Russian interests, the Ukrainian leaders should answer five questions concerning Russia and the Russian leaders. Is the Russian leadership content in its present confines of state or is the Russian leadership looking for ways to increase its territorial holdings or economic status at the expense of Ukraine? Is the Russian leadership secure in its ability to defend the Russian state status quo from any perceived hostile threats from Ukraine? Is the Russian ruling elite able to adequately discern the strengths and weaknesses of Ukraine or is it myopic in its view, allowing single issues to cloud its opinion, and thereby fouling its decision-making process? Is the Russian leadership domestically empowered so that it can effect its

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 538.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 523.

national decisions and international agreements while weathering domestically unpopular decisions without fearing losing power to its political opponents? And finally, Ukraine must determine that if it does not like the present rulers in Moscow, are the alternatives any more conducive to Ukrainian interests?

Table 2. Basic Policies for Managing Different Types of Adversaries⁷¹

	Clear-Sighted	Myopic
Always-Secure Greedy	No general preference for cooperation over competition	Over-invest in military capabilities --often favors offense
Potentially Insecure Greedy	Prefer Defense --“necessary offense” reduces security but does not communicate malign intent --“optional offense” communicates malign intent --reactive offense is a partial exception Arms control useful primarily for shifting to defense	Strongly prefer defense --even “necessary offense” communicates malign intent --reactive offense unlikely to succeed Arms control may be useful for reducing misperceptions
Potentially Insecure Not Greedy	Prefer defense; it lies in the intersection of policies for secure greedy and insecure not-greedy states	Over-invest in defense Engage in arms control only with great caution

⁷¹ Glaser, p. 514.

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III. SHARED HISTORY OF UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

A. INTRODUCTION

Ukraine cannot be understood in isolation from Russia, but, by the same token, Russia cannot be understood in isolation from Ukraine. The two countries define each other in a way that few others do. The historical interconnections between Ukraine and Russia have penetrated every aspect of the current relationship. Their relations are therefore complex and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.⁷²

The present conditions of states do not exist in a vacuum. The international and domestic situations of nations are the result of past interactions of peoples within defined territories. Because any state's present status reflects its history, present and future decisions of state political elites can be estimated to follow certain paths. If in the near and distant past a nation-state was constantly aggressed against by a dominant neighboring state without negative consequences for the aggressor, the aggressed should infer that the future would proceed in similar fashion to the past if there were no change in the political elites within the aggressor state.

Though both Ukraine and Russia labored over seventy years under the yoke of the Soviet Union, the two states and domestic parties within each view the past through separate eyepieces. Differing historical understandings, coupled with present-day domestic and international influences on the Ukrainian and Russian people, contribute to the strong possibility of differing policies in the future. Each country has different leaders and political elites who envision certain directions for their respective nations. When Ukrainian and Russian leaders embark upon a certain policy, they will have made the decision based upon two important assumptions of this thesis: 1) leaders want to stay in power and 2) staying in power requires that leaders improve the strength and security of their state.

⁷² Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1993, p. 5.

To assess what those possible outcomes could be, this chapter reviews the significant historical events that heavily influence the political, social, and demographic interests of Ukrainian and Russian polities.

B. HISTORICAL TIES

Nowhere is the adage “The victors write the history” more appropriate than in describing the historical record of Ukraine and Russia. With Russia being able to subdue Ukraine for much of the imperial and Soviet past, official Russian and then Soviet historians downplayed the historical significance of non-Russian nationalities. Predominant Russian history claims a shifting political center of gravity that started in the mid-Ninth Century in Kiev, migrated north through Suzdal, progressed to Moscow, and then to St. Petersburg⁷³ (the Soviets again moved it back to Moscow). The tsars fashioned this history to emphasize the need for the greater empire. The Soviets adopted the same timeline and technique but for a different reason – to support the “Marxist theory of socio-historical formations (slave-owning society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, communism).”⁷⁴

As events occur, different interpretations of the same events continue to shape the perceptions and prejudices of both Ukrainians and Russians. As Andrew Wilson notes “modern Ukrainian historians risk further polarizing contemporary politics by inverting the traditional Russian-Soviet historical schema and emphasizing a history of conflict rather than cooperation.”⁷⁵ Anatol Lieven points out that the current official historians of both Russia and Ukraine were formerly employed as Soviet historians. These nationalist historians were “not only cut off from new international currents of historical thought, but in many cases they are quite simply accustomed to both preaching state dogma and making the search for and criticism of ‘enemies of socialism’ (or today, of the nation) an essential part of their work.”⁷⁶

⁷³ Lubomyr R. Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation in Historiography*, Ukrainian Historical Association, Toronto, 1988, p. 33.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Anatol Lieven, *Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 1999, p. 61.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 62.

Many Western historians have “by and large, adopted either the traditional pre-1917 Russian scheme or the Soviet version of Russian history” that there is a “oneness of the Slavic East European people” since the middle ages.⁷⁷ This inclination to accept Ukrainian-Russian “oneness” may prevent many nations from exploring possible policies for promoting a separate and independent Ukraine and Russia. However, many Ukrainian and non-Russian historians highlight the inaccuracies of the widely held interpretation that there is a common Eastern Slav culture, and argue that there is a distinct Ukrainian culture and people, as well as Byelorussian, separate and apart from the Great Russians.⁷⁸ It is not the intent of this thesis to determine which school of thought is more true nor who is the rightful descendent of the Kievan Rus; rather, the historiographical rift is exposed because vocal nationalists in both countries claim an inheritance to their past and thereby demand territorial establishments congruent with their understanding of the past.

1. Pre-Soviet History

Though the years of Soviet rule provide the greatest grievances to Ukrainians, many problems reflect conditions and events that arose prior to the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922. Questions concerning the legacy of the Kievan Rus divide nationalists of both countries to the core. Though many within the political arena consider any dispute concerning the “exclusive possession” as inconsequential, there are others who do not. Both Russian and Ukrainian nationalists emphatically argue their respective positions since they both base the legitimacy of their being on the merits of their argument.

Ukrainian nationalists, seeing a need to establish distinct “ideological and historiographical bases of their statehood,” argue that the present-day Ukrainians are in a direct line from the “ethnic and cultural tradition in the old Kievan Rus heartland, and that the Russians of Muscovy by contrast are mainly descended from Finno-Ugric tribes.”

⁷⁷ Wynar, p. 31.

⁷⁸ The most notable Ukrainian historiographer that advocated the separate Ukrainian ethnic culture was Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) whose life spanned the end of the of the Tsarist Russian Empire, the brief Ukrainian independent state, and the tumultuous early years of the socialist state as dictated upon Ukraine by Lenin and Stalin. His importance to the historical edification of Ukrainian people was so great that he was chosen to lead Ukraine following the revolution in 1917 until it was consolidated under Soviet rule in 1920.

The Ukrainian nationalists further dismiss Russian culture, dominated in the northern principalities of Suzdal, Vladimir, and Moscow by the Mongols, as ‘Asiatized.’”⁷⁹ To comprehend the arguments of the nationalists, a brief review of Ukrainian – Russian history is in order.

In 878, Oleg, the Varangian⁸⁰ prince of Novgorod seized control of Kiev and ruled until 912. The lands under his rule were known as the “Rus” from which the Varangians “led their Slavic vassals in attacks on the Byzantines and wars against the Turkish nomads of the eastern and southern steppes.” During the rule of Vladimir (980-1015), the domain converted from paganism to Orthodox Christianity. The Orthodox Metropolitanate of Kiev formed in 1037, during which the reign of Kiev ruled over the territory now known as Ukraine, Belarus, and European Russia. The Eleventh Century saw the gradual disintegration of Kievan rule as feuds between city-states emerged. Continued weakness led to the 1240 Mongol defeat, which resulted in the all regions, minus the western Galicia and Volhynia, being subjugated as vassals to the Mongols.⁸¹

In 1244, the independent western kingdom Galicia-Volhynia reached its apex in power. In 1299, the Metropolitan of Kiev left the city and settled in the principality of Vladimir near present-day Moscow. With this departure, “Kiev’s religious and cultural supremacy over Rus drew to a close.” Over the course of the next century, Poland annexed Galicia while Lithuania annexed Volhynia. In 1362, Lithuania defeated the Mongols and assumed control over most of what is now Ukraine. In 1471, Muscovite forces defeated the independent city-state of Novgorod. The Sixteenth Century saw Tsar Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible) conquer Kazan and Astrakhan as the eastern expansion of Muscovy began. Catholic and Orthodoxy forces bound themselves together as Lithuania and Poland agreed to the Union of Brest in 1596. Under the term “Uniates,” the two sides adopted an arrangement in which the Orthodox “accepted the supremacy of the pope while retaining their own liturgy and traditions.” The first half of the Seventeenth Century saw Orthodox Cossacks revolt against Polish rule and the Uniates from the west.

⁷⁹ Lieven, p. 13.

⁸⁰ Varangians were Scandinavians who crossed the Baltic Sea in the ninth century and settled in eastern Europe.

⁸¹ Ibid., p.12,13.

The rebellions led to the rise of the Cossack leader Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky, who defeated the Poles in 1648, and in 1649, entered Kiev victorious and proclaimed a new Rus state. During the next decade, the Polish armies returned in strength, forcing Khmelnytsky to seek protection from the Poles by aligning his reign with the Romanov family ruling from Moscow under the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654.⁸²

The import and meaning of the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654, with its lasting effects, continues today to drive wedges between the nationalistic forces of Ukraine and Russia. As Khmelnytsky swore allegiance to Tsar Alexei, the tsar changed his title from “Tsar of All Rus” to “Tsar of All Great and Little Rus.” Eventually the term “Little Rus” acquired a negative connotation. Lieven illustrates one scenario wherein Ukrainian national individuality is lost.

The Russian Empire, which had succeeded the tsardom of Muscovy had replaced the ancient word “Rus” with a new one “Rossiya,” or Russia, and designated Ukraine (not then generally called Ukraine) as not Malaya [Little] Rus, but Malaya Rossiya. From being a recognized sharer in the patrimony of the ancient Rus, “Ukraine” was thereby clearly designated a subordinate province of a new state.⁸³

It must be noted that the Cossack rulers gained guarantees from the tsar, ensuring “the rights of the Cossacks, the status of the Cossack nobility, and the freedom of Ukrainian towns to elect the own municipal governments.”⁸⁴

The differing opinions of the import of the Treaty of Pereiaslav are great, and not just between the vocal nationalists. For the Ukrainians, the treaty was “simply a personal union between two states, under the rule of one monarch, but with quite separate administrative, judicial, educational, and even military institutions and traditions.” When subsequent tsars violated the treaty as imperial rule attempted to quash most semblances of Ukrainian nationality, the Pereiaslav agreement itself was rendered “null and void.”⁸⁵

⁸² Ibid., p. 16,17.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 20.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

To the Russians, the treaty signified Khmelnytsky's "submission" to a destined "reunification of the lands of the Rus" under the rule of a single monarch. Lieven postulates "the Muscovite state, with its traditions of autocracy, absolutism, and the complete absence of legal estates and rights, was simply incapable of grasping the notion of a binding contract between the monarch and a part of his people." It can be said that the same incapacity remains prevalent throughout the ruling elite of today.⁸⁶ The subsequent years under domain of the Russian Empire resulted in continued Cossack and Ukrainian suppression by the throne. As Lithuania and Poland decreased in strength, the power void on the western border was filled by Sweden and later Austria. The Ukrainian western provinces continually dealt with the tumult of the power shifts and experienced more and more exposure to the European states.

In 1689, Peter the Great ascended to the throne and bestowed upon himself the title "Emperor of All the Russians." His empire building severely impinged upon the steppe and the livelihood of the Cossacks. With the 1708 defeat at Poltava at the hands of the Russians, the Cossacks found their autonomy greatly diminished, as the Russian government appointed a puppet hetman to administer the law as St. Petersburg saw fit. Within the next sixty years, any notion of Ukrainian autonomy was eradicated as Russia incorporated the Ukrainian territory. Sloboda Ukraine fell in 1765, followed by Zaporozhia in 1775, and then the Hetmanate between 1781 and 1785.⁸⁷ When the Russian troops occupied and abolished the Zaporozhian Cossack base, the last remnant of Ukrainian autonomy disappeared under tsarist Russia. Concurrently, Russian serfdom was "introduced" to Ukraine; however, the Cossack and Ukrainian nobility became thoroughly integrated into the bureaucracy of the empire by 1835.⁸⁸ In the middle of the Eighteenth Century, the Russian army also defeated the Ottoman Empire in battle and acquired Dnipropetrovsk, Sevastopol, and Odessa and the Southern Steppes, greatly increasing the lands of the Russian Empire and acquiring its long sought access to the Black Sea.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 22,23.

⁸⁷ Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, Washington, 1996, p. 265.

⁸⁸ Lieven, p. 24.

⁸⁹ Since Crimea and the Southern Steppes (New Russia) were conquered by the Russian forces and

Even though “Ukraine had been stamped with the seal of the empire” by 1796, the Russification of Ukraine escalated throughout the Nineteenth Century. Two decrees targeted the root of Ukrainian society – the Ukrainian language, which Russia realized was “the primary vehicle for transmitting Ukrainian national and cultural values.” The Valuev Decree, issued in 1863, prohibited the publishing of books written in Ukrainian. The Elms Decree of 1876 both reiterated the prohibition of printing Ukrainian books and precluded their importation from abroad. It further officially “repudiated the existence of a Ukrainian nationality.”⁹⁰ With the decree that no Ukrainian nationality even existed, the next logical step for Russian historiographers would to deduce that “all Eastern Slavs were presented as one nation – the Russian people.”⁹¹

As the Russian Empire grew in size, it also grew in administrative weight. The 1905 revolution resulted in a series of reforms in Russia and in Ukraine. Though the Ukrainian national movement was founded in 1840 by the nationalist poet Taras Shevchenko, followed by the establishment of Ukrainian cultural societies throughout the 1850s, it was not until the 1905 revolution that nationalist sentiment could be expressed openly.⁹²

The First World War combined with internal strife and revolutionary activity undermined the Russian Empire and the reign of the Romanov family. Without dissecting the entire period from the start of the First World War in 1914 to the Treaty of Union between the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1920, the overriding theme to the average Ukrainian was anarchy.⁹³ The production capabilities and, more importantly, the distribution of grain and foodstuffs fell as the peasantry became less endeared to any central government and more concerned with supplying their staples for their families.⁹⁴ Coupled with the peasant rebellions

settled under Russian imperial rule, many Russians of today use this historical event as the underpinnings to their claim of having legal rights to the peninsula and much of the territory of eastern and southern Ukraine. See Lieven, p. 26.

⁹⁰ Wynar, p. 4.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁹² Lieven, p. 24.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 29.

⁹⁴ Magocsi, p. 486.

demanding land reforms, any government during the tumultuous times found itself with minimized support from the vast majority of the country. Whether it was the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, Ukrainian National Republic (who garnered support from the Central Powers to ward off the advancing Bolsheviks) through the Brest-Litvsk Treaty, the German puppet Hetmanate led by the Cossack Skoropads'kyi, the second Ukrainian National Republic under the control of the Directory,⁹⁵ any controlling party ruled the country in name, and not necessarily in practice, for the common peasant was too concerned for his own welfare.

The results of the revolutionary period of 1917 through 1920 had its positive and negative effects upon Ukraine. The negative explanation states that the Treaty of Paris effectively stripped Ukraine of three of its western provinces: eastern Galicia went to Poland, Romania assumed northern Bukovina, and Czechoslovakia garnered Transcarpathia. The settlement thereby ended the national revolutionary effort to join all of Ukraine under an autonomous state.⁹⁶ However, the positive explanation claims that for the first time

After 1917, energy and sacrifice on behalf of the national cause burst forth, in the political, social, cultural, and military spheres. And even if these efforts did not bring about the hoped-for independence, the revolutionary experience itself instilled in Ukrainians a firm sense of national purpose – achieved, moreover, not after several generations of peacetime cultural work, but in less than half a decade. From such a perspective, the Ukrainian revolution was a remarkable success.⁹⁷

2. Soviet Policies

With the formation of the Soviet Union on December 30, 1922, Ukraine “voluntarily” became a union republic and no longer an independent republic. During

⁹⁵ In 1918, after a desperate power-saving attempt by Skoropads'kyi in which he attempted to trade Ukrainian autonomy for support from the non-communists Russian forces, the Ukrainian National Union, led by Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura, staged a movement to overthrow the Hetmanate and Skoropads'kyi. Gaining cooperation from the Ukrainian Bolsheviks as well as tacit support from the Russian Soviet, the Directory was formed. With the end of First World War, Skoropads'kyi fled Kiev, as his German benefactors were no longer able to provide the Hetmanate support. “The Directory was now left to deal by itself not only with the anti-Bolshevik Russians, the so-called Whites, but with an even greater threat to its existence, The Bolshevik Reds.” See Magocsi, p. 492,493.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 519.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 520.

state-building discussions of the Party leaders, Josef Stalin proposed, “to make independent republics the autonomous ones within the Russian Federation.” To counter Stalin, Lenin went even further and proposed that all the independent soviet republics were equal in their right to create a new state federation and that every union republic even maintained the right to secede from the federation. Lenin’s proposal carried the day as Stalin chose not to challenge Lenin’s proposal. “And it was not a coincidence since the dictatorship of the party, which turned the USSR into the unitary state, never was reflected in Soviet constitutions.”⁹⁸

Because of the established dictatorship, the Ukrainian and Russian political institutions (outside of the Party) suffered in their inability to establish themselves through the existence of the Soviet Union. Eventually, the absence of an individual Russian Federation distinguishable from that of the Soviet Union was the vehicle of discontent that Boris Yeltsin rode in his successful effort to displace Mikhail Gorbachev in the early 1990s.

At face value the 1922 “merger” of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with the Soviet Union and the resulting sixty-nine years of domination presented little, if any, benefit to the viability of a Ukrainian nation. Not only did the draconian economic and political decisions from Moscow during Soviet rule exacerbate the misery of Ukrainians, but these decisions also adversely affected the ordinary Russian livelihood as well, forcing both Ukrainian and Russian polities to seek escape from the central communist domination when given the opportunity in 1990 and 1991. Both states continue to suffer the ill effects from a regime that demanded everything from its citizens while returning little to its people.

Ironically, the trials and tribulations of the Soviet system that Ukraine endured “united most Ukrainian-speaking areas and established for the first time a theoretically and to some extent actually autonomous territorial state, called Ukraine.” With Lenin and Stalin both in favor of establishing the “national” states to better serve the proletarian historical march of history,⁹⁹ the administrative apparatus and boundaries afforded by the

⁹⁸ Embassy of Ukraine, “History of Ukraine,” Washington, D. C. Accessed online 12 November 2002 <<http://www.ukremb.com/ukraine/historypart3.htm>>.

⁹⁹ Magocsi, p. 534-537.

Communist Party provided a fertile ground where nationalistic attitudes could flourish well beyond the Party's intent.¹⁰⁰

In a similar unintended outcome, the brutal and effective methods that Stalin used to eradicate the Polish minority population from western Ukraine facilitated the independence and border arrangements in 1991 when Ukraine became independent. Nowhere on any of Ukraine's borders is there less friction and turmoil despite the fact that the two westernmost provinces continue to be the loudest advocate for anti-Russian sentiment.¹⁰¹ If Stalin had not forcefully moved the Polish minority, would not the Poles expect Warsaw to resolve their differences with Kiev with a decidedly skewed outcome in favor of the Polish population? Would not the Polish population in Poland today demand such a result? Additionally, with the Ukrainian-Polish border settled, the ameliorating situation denies "Russian national imperialists" one of their core rallying cries -- Russia must be strong with Ukraine and Belarus to stop the traditional enemy from Poland.¹⁰²

During the sixty-nine year communist rule, Moscow allowed the policy of Ukrainianization to occur on three separate occasions: in the 1920s, during 1960s, and just prior to the collapse during the late-1980s. The first two, though later retracted and avenged, "helped to strengthen Ukrainian identity and preserve the Ukrainian language in areas where it otherwise might have been supplanted by Russia." Moscow and Stalin favored the 1923 policy of Ukrainianization

Which, they hoped, would strengthen the CP(b)U's [Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Ukraine] otherwise weak roots in the countryside.... The result was that the CP(b)U adopted a program for Ukrainianization of the party apparatus, schools, and cultural educational organizations. From that moment, the CP(b)U itself helped to transform the Soviet republic it headed into a country that was Ukrainian in fact as well as in name.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Lieven, p. 32.

¹⁰¹ Lieven points out that in 1939 Stalin took the provinces of Galicia and Volhynia from Poland and gave them to Ukraine. This move elated the Ukrainian nationalists at the time. Subsequently, the two provinces have continued to be the agitators of the most virulent anti-Russian speech and actions. See Lieven, p. 33.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁰³ Magocsi, p. 538.

In 1928, Stalin launched the First Five-Year Plan, aimed at “rapid industrialization” that would be paid for by “nationalizing all remaining sectors of the economy” and the collectivization of the agriculture sector.¹⁰⁴ The Soviet collectivization of farms met severe resistance by the Ukrainian kulaks who were performing well under the previous 1921 New Economic Policy (NEP). However since the NEP was the temporary “one step backward” to get the economy going after the First World War, Stalin used the need to take the required “two steps forward” to assist in “his struggle to attain uncontested political power.”¹⁰⁵

Since collectivization did not proceed as well as Stalin believed that it should have, he initiated the kulak purge in 1929. By March 1930, 250,000 Ukrainian kulaks were either shot or deported. In 1933, Stalin, attempting to crush all manners of dispute emanating from Ukraine, ended Ukrainianization and ushered in the “terror famine” wherein there were no natural causes to the shortage of food, rather Stalin choose to withhold the capability to plant and harvest the food. The famine resulted in death estimates of 4.5 million to 8 million people.¹⁰⁶

Even though many Russians and Kazakhs died in the famine, especially Cossacks within the Don, Kuban, and Orenburg regions, some contemporary Ukrainian nationalists consider the terror famine as an attempted Russian genocide against the Ukrainians. These nationalists seemingly ignore the fact that Ukrainians also maintained high positions within the Soviet government and were complicit in the Soviet actions that led to the deaths of many Russians as well. Even though this opinion is in the clear minority, because some present members of the Ukrainian government (Ministry of Education), as well members of the nationalist intelligentsia, hold such views, the opinion often finds itself vented into the public discourse.¹⁰⁷

The military actions during the Second World War devastated Ukraine but the political maneuvers by Stalin at the conclusion of the war enlarged the country in size and population. It is estimated that World War II cost the lives of 35-60 million people.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 551.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 550.

¹⁰⁶ Lieven, p. 34.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 36-39.

Of this number, the Soviet Union incurred the loss of 11 million combatants and another 7 million civilians. Ukraine suffered the brunt of this number: 4.1 million civilian deaths and another 1.4 million dead or captured. The Soviet Union evacuated 3.9 million Ukrainians eastward to avoid the German onslaught and the conquering Germans deported another 2.2 million westward for forced labor within the Third Reich.¹⁰⁸

As an area of operations that saw some of the most brutal combat, Ukraine suffered a “scorched earth policy” by the retreating Soviets in 1941. In 1943 and 1944, the Germans applied a “zone of destruction” to slow the advancing Red Army. As a result, 28,000 villages and 714 cities were either fully or partially destroyed. Kiev was eighty-five percent devastated and Kharkiv was left at seventy percent in ruins. If a Ukrainian was not dead or captured, there was a good chance that he or she was left homeless as more than 19 million lost their homes.¹⁰⁹ In addition to the human losses, Ukraine also endured the destruction of 16,000 enterprises, hundreds of coalmines, electrical power stations, dams, roads, bridges as well as massive damage and destruction to the collective farms and tractor stations of the agricultural sector.¹¹⁰

The results of the Second World War, however, also had some beneficial impact for Ukraine. With the Soviet Union among the victorious allies, Stalin pressed for land gains at the expense of the eastern European nations. Poland’s borders shifted to the west, at the expense of Germany, allowing Ukraine to expand west into Galicia and Volhynia, and Bessarabia. Ukraine also assumed the province of Transcarpathia for the first time after Stalin pressured Czechoslovakia. These postwar land acquisitions expanded Soviet Ukraine’s territory approximately one-quarter and its population by 11 million.¹¹¹ With the new population came a greater number of Poles in the minority. This problem was quickly resolved as Stalin had the Poles forcefully deported between 1945 and 1947.¹¹² Following the conclusion of the Second World War, drought provided

¹⁰⁸ Magocsi, P. 638.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 639.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 639- 642.

¹¹² Lieven, p. 35.

the natural causes while the collectivization policies and terror provided the man-made causes for a devastating famine that claimed nearly a million more Ukrainian lives.

The remaining forty-five years under the Soviet Union ebbed and flowed for the people of Ukraine. Though he had risen up through the ranks under Stalin's tutelage, Khrushchev, upon becoming the General Secretary, commenced to resolve some of the inherent problems with the regime. In 1953, ending the mass terror and initiating a "de-Stalinization" program, Khrushchev permitted a "thaw" throughout the Soviet Union, hoping to be "the leader who would at last permit the system to realize its human and economic potential. His ambition was to prepare the transition from the 'socialism' that had already been achieved to the full 'communism'" that had been the goal of the party leaders since Marx."¹¹³ Khrushchev's agricultural reforms and increased industrialization goals¹¹⁴ caused Ukraine to "cease to be a mainly rural country."¹¹⁵ Eventually, his peers grew weary of his domestic and foreign policy failures and finally removed him from his post in 1964.

Throughout his tenure and rule, Khrushchev displayed a preference for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In 1954, as "yet another affirmation of the great fraternal love and trust of the Russian people for Ukraine,"¹¹⁶ he ceded the Crimea to Ukrainian Republic. Also in 1954, the Soviet Union "celebrated" the 300-year anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav which demonstrated the "age-old brotherly love of Ukrainians and Russians and exemplified the general Marxist-Leninist proletarian principle of 'friendship among peoples.'"¹¹⁷ The Crimean decision continues to haunt the Russian nationalists and is one of their focal grievances.

From 1963 until 1972, a second iteration of Ukrainianization policy prospered under the governance of Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. It too was later reversed as Brezhnev ended the "de-Stalinization" policy, as evidenced in

¹¹³ Martin Malia, *The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991*, Free Press, New York, 1994, pp.318-321. Also see Magosci, p. 653.

¹¹⁴ Malia, p. 327-341.

¹¹⁵ Lieven, p. 35.

¹¹⁶ Magosci, p. 653.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 654.

Prague in 1968. Four years later, when Brezhnev installed Volodymyr Shcherbytsky in Shelest's stead, Russification was reinstated in Ukraine with a vengeance and remained in effect until 1989. A return of the official policy of Russification, wherein the official use of the Ukrainian language was prohibited, attempted to extinguish all thought of an independent Ukraine -- however the seed had been planted.

The legacy of the central economic plan, illustrated by the industrialization efforts and the collectivization, continues to hamper both nations in their moves away from communism and toward market economies. Under the Soviet system, the extensive orientation of production (for production sake) required ever-increasing amounts of material resources and labor force. The production quotas required the production managers to ignore the environmental hazards, resulting in the waste of natural resources and a pollution level ten times more extensive than the USSR as a whole. After the explosion of the fourth power unit of Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986, ecological conditions in the republic grew worse. Moscow's mishandling of Ukrainian interests, culminating in the 1986 nuclear mishap at Chernobyl, enhanced the stature and voice of those who advocated independence from the Soviet Union.¹¹⁸

With the development of the system crisis, the state actively used the principle of "price scissors" when the lion's share of the income of collective and state farms come to the state budget. The agriculture more and more lagged behind while the flow of those who left villages still increased. In 1960, the peasants composed a half of the population of Ukraine, while in 1985 only a third. It proved impossible to feed the two-thirds of town-dwellers under the labor productivity of those times. So the food supply problem got worse year after year.¹¹⁹

As the central planning system demanded increasing production, especially from the military-industrial complex that was in Ukraine, the capabilities to do so became fewer and less productive. The "military-industrial complex exhausted the national economy" as a "necessity to keep to parity in arms with the western countries brought the Soviet Union to the economic abyss." "Thousands of billions of 'petrol dollars' earned

¹¹⁸ Embassy of Ukraine.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

during the world petroleum crisis of the 1970s” were squandered upon propping up the failed economic system.¹²⁰

3. Post-Soviet Decisions

When the unpopular Shcherbytsky lost his place in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the “pace of political change quickened in Soviet Ukraine.” The Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring)¹²¹ mobilized its members for the March 1990 election for the Verkhovna Rada (the Supreme Soviet in Ukraine). Witnessing the measurable electoral success of the Rukh in which the Rukh gained over 100 of the 450 seats contested, the ‘democratic’ wing of the Communists joined the Rukh candidates in action. Together, these forces “were instrumental in having the parliament declare Ukraine a sovereign state on 16 July 1990.”¹²²

The important political development was the number of Communists and former Communists that broke from their previous loyal pro-Moscow attitudes and their willingness to create the “legal and administrative infrastructure for the sovereign state.”¹²³ This practice remained true throughout the 1990s as evidenced by the fact that both Ukrainian presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, are former members of the Communist Party (incidentally, both their fathers were killed in battle during the Second World War).

During the failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev by conservative political forces, Kravchuk quickly realized the political gain of aligning himself with the nationalist tide and “spearheaded a resolution that declared Ukraine an independent state.” The declaration set dates for the successful December 1991 referendum wherein ninety-two percent of the population voted in favor of independence, including eighty

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ The largest and most influential of the new organizations that formed during Gorbachev’s Glasnost was the Rukh (The Movement). The Rukh was led by influential writers who published their program in February 1989 calling for the ‘rebirth and comprehensive development of the Ukrainian nation.’ “The program stressed the need for political, economic, environmental, and cultural reforms as well as institutionalized guarantees for human rights.” It emphasized Ukrainian character and language while maintaining respect for religious and ethnic minorities. “It did not call for independence, but rather for the transformation of the Soviet Union into a union of truly sovereign states with assurances that Ukraine could determine its own political, economic, and cultural affairs without interference from Moscow.” Magocsi, p. 670.

¹²² Ibid., p. 672.

percent of the “supposedly russified eastern industrial oblasts. Crimea also cast an affirmative vote with fifty-four percent approval.”¹²⁴

Even though Ukraine had declared independence previously during the Twentieth Century, this time was different. In 1991, the process was a peaceful one, the election was conducted under the watchful eye of the world, the politicians of the political system that was being voted out of office participated freely in the referendum, and the outcome was numerically significant as eighty percent of the eligible voting population participated. The international community welcomed the result and United Nations membership as an independent state was awarded within weeks. “Finally, the fact that nine out of every ten inhabitants approved independence confirmed that Ukrainian statehood was the wish not only of Ukrainian nationalists. In effect, an independent Ukraine seemed to promise the most attractive alternative for all those who wanted change, whether in politics, the economy, the environment, or cultural life.”¹²⁵

Since 1991, there have been both bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements between Russia, Ukraine, and other states that have either strengthened preconceived fears or ameliorated the concerns of the political entities within both countries. As Ukraine and Russia evolve away from Soviet rule, “Ukrainian foreign policy is attempting to walk a tightrope between the country’s Western aspirations and its Eastern Slavic roots and anchors that go much deeper than seventy-something years of Soviet experience.”¹²⁶ Whether Ukraine can continue to balance its foreign policy issues in the future -- the base question of this thesis -- remains to be seen. The short but full history of the 1990s is telling in how the ruling parties in both Ukraine and Russia approached difficult but interrelated issues. In the following pages, the thesis explores two of these issues: the purpose of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the negotiations over Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. Some agreements have been successful in solving the problem while others have neither effectively fixed the problem nor addressed the root

¹²³Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 674.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Mikhail Molchanov, “Conclusion,” *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, p. 263.

cause. Because of severe distrust of the other state's intentions, competing domestic actors have ladled scorn and derision upon the agreements.

a. Commonwealth of Independent States

During the fateful month of December 1991, the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia met in Minsk and set in motion the formal process of dissolving the Soviet Union. In the Minsk Agreement, signed on 8 December, the three largest republics of the Soviet Union declared that they “terminated its existence.” Though the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)¹²⁷ in retrospect has drawn much legal scrutiny, the fact remains that within two weeks the Republics of the Soviet Union accepted the central premise that the Union should be abolished for something far less controlling. On 21 December 1991 at Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, eight other republics as well as the original three signed the Protocol that affirmed the validity of the CIS Agreement. The CIS would “enter into force for each of the parties from the moment of its ratification.”¹²⁸

The charter of the CIS was decidedly brief since the newly independent and emerging states, “especially Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine were mindful of the experience of the Soviet Union central authorities, and were quite reluctant to create any powerful institutions which could threaten their newfound sovereignty.”¹²⁹ Even though most of the Newly Independent States (NIS), especially Ukraine, wanted to ensure that the CIS did not present Russia with a legal forum to plan “military intervention in the ‘near abroad’ whenever it deemed necessary,” they realized that the “Soviet Union’s centralized economic structure made close cooperation among the successor states essential, particularly since many key industries were located in only one or two republics.”¹³⁰

¹²⁷ John Fowler, *Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States*, The RussiaSite.org. Accessed online 13 November 2002, <<http://www.therussiasite.org/legal/laws/CISAgreement.html>>.

¹²⁸ Academy of European Law, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: An Emerging Institutional Model,” *European Journal of International Law*. Accessed online 13 November 2002, <<http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol4/No3/Art6-01.html>>.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Peter van Ham, “Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Implications for Western Policy,” *Chaillot Paper 13*, February 1994. Accessed online, <<http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai13e.html>>.

Many of the NIS determined that after seventy years of autocratic and forcibly integrated rule, to deal with thorny decisions concerning “the partition of joint property, economic infrastructures, the armed forces and its equipment, as well as citizenship,” an organized approach was necessary. Russia and Kazakhstan wanted a strong framework that provided for “economic and financial integration and the development of a joint foreign and defense policy.” Ukraine, more so than any other republic of the FSU, decided early in the process that the CIS should be nothing more than a tool to facilitate a “civilized divorce.” Though Ukraine was and continues to be dependent upon Russian energy supplies and certain aspects of economic security, it continues to want the CIS to be a “loose structure of fully independent countries” and views “an institutionalized CIS” as an entity that “would encroach upon its newly acquired sovereignty.”¹³¹

Russia approached the founding of the CIS with the same official attitude. President Boris Yeltsin “managed to convince Russians, if not all other subjects of the Soviet Union, that Russia herself throughout the seventy years of the Soviet power had been economically exploited, politically oppressed, and deprived of her historic traditions and national statehood by the omnipotent Communist elite.” Whether or not Russia experienced the same horrific fate of other republics is debatable. Within the economic and natural resource realm of Soviet history, Russia did function as an “internal colony” for the Soviet Union, which constantly drained Russian resources. “For decades Russian oil, natural gas, gold, and other raw materials that could have been successfully marketed abroad giving Russia hundreds of billions dollars were provided to other Soviet republics at heavily subsidized prices in exchange for low quality consumer goods and services.”¹³² However, before accepting that Russia suffered during the Soviet years on an equal or greater basis than did the other republics, one must also consider political and cultural factors, including the fact that the Slavic Russians had a significant role in establishing and building such a system in the first place.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Andrei Kortunov, “Russia and the ‘Near Abroad:’ Looking for a Model Relationship,” 1999. Accessed online 21 May 2002, <<http://isuisse.ifrance.com/emmaf2/USRUS/usrp7.html>>.

During the establishment and ratification process of the CIS, there were two major issues of concern, the control and disposition of the armed forces and the extent of economic integration between the NIS. Because of a number of factors, including the Soviet legacy, the newness of the FSU governments, the weakness of the FSU militaries, the intrusive nature of the inherited economic systems and energy infrastructures, different NIS approached the CIS with different goals. The effectiveness of the CIS as a centrally controlling mechanism has not materialized since Ukraine, as one of its most significant original drafters and members, chose to not be more aligned with the confederated ideals.

The two largest nations of the former Soviet Union maintained different outlooks: “Ukraine favored bilateral agreements and treaties and considered the CIS as an active mechanism for negotiation and consultation. Russia, on the other hand, pressed for closer integration within CIS and [for the] formation of economic, political, and even military blocks under her leadership.”¹³³ As a drafter of the original CIS Agreement, Ukraine consciously chose not to be a full member of the 1994 Economic Union of CIS and then, in 1995, Kuchma declared that Ukraine would not join any military alliance within the CIS, fearing that the structure would present undue pressure from Russia.

b. Nuclear Weapons

The establishment of independent states after the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the *de facto* realization that instead of one monolithic superpower maintaining control and launch authority of thousands of nuclear weapons, there were now four. The Soviet Union, in its military posture, had situated both tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons (both missiles and bombers) within four different republics – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. For varying reasons, Kazakhstan and Belarus quickly agreed to surrender their ICBMs to Russia; Ukraine did not. Since their plebiscite in December 1991, Ukraine explored the positives and negatives of being a nuclear weapon state. In January 1994, Ukraine finally agreed with Washington and

¹³³ George Skoryk, “History of Ukraine – Toward Year 2000,” Compiled from Radio Free Europe, Ukrainian Weekly, and other reference sources. Accessed online 21 May 2002, <<http://members.oxemail.com.au/~retengnr/ukrexaf1.html>>.

Moscow to dismantle its ICBMs, though it still hedged on the timetable -- not fully dismantling and “denuclearizing” itself until 1995.

Why did Ukraine take so long to reach a final decision? The main reason is that Ukraine wanted the international community, especially the West, to broker agreements involving Russia and Ukraine, not only in 1994, but also in the future.

With its independence, Ukraine assumed a huge strategic force that alone would have been the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world. “The strategic nuclear weapons were deployed on 46 ten-warhead SS-24 ICBMs (total 460 warheads), 130 six-warhead SS-19 ICBMs (780 warheads), 25 Bear-H16 strategic bombers, each capable of carrying up to 16 warheads on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and 19 Blackjack strategic bombers, each carrying up to twelve warheads on ALCMs.”¹³⁴ Additionally there were a significant number of tactical warheads in Ukraine; some sources state that the number was approximately 3,000¹³⁵ while others have numbers that range from 2,650 up to 4,200.¹³⁶

By July 1992, all of the tactical nuclear weapons were to have been removed to Russia in accordance with the December 1991 Alma Ata Agreement. During the removal process, the Rada (the Ukrainian parliament), gaining its feet within the national security policy decision-making process, began to resent Russia applying economic blackmail with energy credits against Ukrainian interests, especially in regards to the Black Sea Fleet.¹³⁷ The Rada pressured Kravchuk to halt the tactical nuclear weapon transfer process in March of 1992, but before Kiev could affect the process, Yeltsin announced in May of 1992 that all of the tactical nuclear weapons had been displaced to Russian territory, two months ahead of schedule.¹³⁸ What remained of the strategic forces on Ukrainian soil were the ICBMs and the bombers.

¹³⁴ Jones, Rodney W., Mark G. McDonough with Toby F Dalton and Gregory D. Koblenz, *Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, A Guide in Maps and Charts*, 1998, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 89.

¹³⁵ van Ham, p. 9.

¹³⁶ Rodney W. Jones, et al, p. 89.

¹³⁷ William C. Potter, “The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1995, p. 21.

¹³⁸ van Ham, p. 9.

Despite the fact that Ukraine still had over a thousand nuclear warheads on its soil, this did not endow Kiev with the capability or title of being a superpower with a survivable nuclear deterrent. Launch authority, launch control, launch codes, and a host of other pertinent issues precluded Kiev from making such claims. As William Kincade pointed out in the summer of 1993, Ukraine would have had to scale numerous and serious hurdles to gain such capability.¹³⁹ Ukraine would have needed to gain physical possession and operational control while avoiding war with Russia. Ukraine would have needed to develop and deploy a sophisticated early-warning system. Ukraine did not have the satellites or capability to retarget the ICBMs. The ICBMs were not dispersed and could easily have been targeted for a preemptive attack. Ukraine did not have the maintenance system and expertise to ensure the viability of the weapons. And Ukraine did not have the “training, testing, design, and production facilities necessary for eventual modernization.” Even President Kravchuk noted the technical hurdles in April of 1993:

Every sensible person knows that all the electronic circuits, everything that directs the warheads is in Moscow and Ukraine cannot change that, even if it wanted to. For Ukraine to have its own nuclear forces it would have to own its own warheads manufactured in Ukraine. We don't have the nuclear industry or the intention to do that.¹⁴⁰

Regardless of launch authority and command and control (which had been placed under the CIS through the Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces), Ukraine had nuclear-armed missiles on their sovereign territory and on bases that they controlled. The attitude of Kiev shifted from “What can nuclear weapons do for our national defense?” to “What can we get for them?”

In the early 1990s, the external threats to the actual state of Ukraine were not the greatest concern. Rather, the utmost fear of Ukraine was that of overbearing Russian influence which, left unchecked, could possibly cause Ukrainians themselves (led by the eastern provinces of Ukraine) to accept an *anschluss* with Moscow in the future. The fear was not of invading forces from the North and East, nor was it a fear of

¹³⁹ William H. Kincade, “Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Hollow Threat, Wasting Asset,” *Arms Control Today*, July/August 1993, p. 14.

¹⁴⁰ Morrison, John, “Pereyaslav and After: the Russian – Ukrainian Relationship,” *International Affairs*, vol 69, no 4, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Cambridge, University Press, October 1993, p. 698.

violent revolution from within. It was, and continues to be, the psychological anathema that Ukraine cannot stand up to Russia on its own. Because of this stigma, Ukraine sought international recognition in 1991. But with the recognition came the pressure from the West that Ukraine should forsake its nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

When early bilateral decisions between Ukraine and Russia tipped toward Russia's favor at the expense of Ukraine -- such as with the Black Sea Fleet, trade policies, and the return of the tactical nuclear weapons -- Ukraine began to seek multi-lateral agreements with the West. These multilateral treaties ensured that Russia also had a vested interest in adherence to the agreements. According to Kiev, the only issue that kept the West involved with the Ukrainian predicament was the nuclear weapon issue. Consequently, Kiev used their nuclear bargaining chip to persuade the West to act as the honest broker between Ukraine and Russian strategic matters.

C. CONCLUSION

Though they share a long history of grief and bitter turmoil, the Ukrainian and Russian people have been exposed to different external and internal factors that influence their opinions of each other and their understandings of their state. The history of imperial impositions resulted in Russians adopting incongruent attitudes about their own lineage and the constitution of their nationality. Different Russian constituencies, for varying reasons, have accepted different outlooks about what constitutes "Russia." Nationalistic factions continue to refer to the historical past to support their primary idea: for Ukrainian nationalists, history allows for a separate and sovereign Ukrainian nation; for Russian nationalists, history blurs such a distinction and promotes the oneness of the Russian Slavic people across Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

Because of the severe abuses by the oppressive imperial and Soviet governments, the Russians and Ukrainians, when presented the opportunity for independence in 1991, seized the chance. Because of differing levels of institutional experience, the Ukrainian and Russian governments adhered to different paths in their attempts to promote their sovereignty and their power, respectively. During the 1990s, Ukraine and Russia approached each other with different understandings of how the former states of the Soviet Union should interact.

During the 1990s, Ukraine and Russia experienced crippling economic woes, debated in earnest concerning the disposition of Ukrainian nuclear weapons, and approached the strength and wealth of the Western powers; Ukraine evolved to have a *realpolitik* appreciation of Russia while striving to maintain its sovereignty.

To determine how Ukraine and Russia will continue to interact in the future, the thesis offers a current understanding of their present conditions. Presently, since both states have somewhat-democratically elected governments, different domestic factions promote different methods of governance with varying views of the other state. How these domestic factions align themselves through the democratic process assists in determining whether Ukraine can improve its security with competitive or cooperative measures.

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IV. UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN STATE OF AFFAIRS

A. INTRODUCTION

Reflecting the nature of their long history together, Ukrainian and Russian independence in 1991 resulted in different understandings of how each country should approach their goals of economic strength and national security. Because of differences in ethnicities, natural resources, industrial infrastructure, landmasses, historical appreciations, and perceptions of others, Ukraine and Russia, as well as most other states of the former Soviet Union, took different paths toward reaching their intended goals.

This chapter illustrates the present situation focusing on the Ukrainian-Russian relationship. It delineates the major domestic competitors within each country and specifies certain partialities and policies of those players resulting from their own historical experience. It first details Ukraine's domestic situation, explaining the geo-strategic importance that the West assigns to fostering a strong and independent Ukraine. It then explains the factors, specifically energy requirements and monetary gain that, at least in the near future, inherently tie Ukraine to Russia.

The chapter then explores the different domestic political projects in Russia. Through different analyses of the historical record, varied prejudices and perceptions evolved, forging different opinions about the future goals of Russia and what Russia should be. Personal experiences and economically vested interests create affinities toward five different state-building projects, identified by Igor Zevelev.¹⁴¹ For theoretical usefulness, the thesis applies Glaser's labels to each project, thus affording Ukraine an appreciation of the benefits and dangers of each project. Though each project has a different approach to dealing with the NIS, political expediency has required the five projects to enter coalitions with the most similar projects. The chapter concludes with a subjective determination of the which project the current Russian administration adheres to, and thus, deduces which project the domestic opposition in Russia ascribes to as well.

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B. UKRAINIAN SITUATION

1. Geo-strategic Importance

a. Location

Ukraine has the geo-strategic position and the natural resources to make the country economically and militarily strong as either an independent state or as a valuable member of an alliance. Recent political decisions and embedded corruption, coupled with a woefully dependent industrial capability, however, will continue to hamper the state on any path to sustained progress.

Ukraine's size, its neighbors, and the importance of the region as a whole give great strategic meaning to the West's desire for a vibrant and independent Ukraine. Comprised of over 600,000 square kilometers, which is slightly smaller than the state of Texas, and a population of 48,396,000 people,¹⁴² Ukraine maintains the inherent size of a regional power. It is one of, if not the most geographically dominating state bordering the Black Sea, with the seacoast on the Black Sea of 1533 kilometers and on the Sea of Azov for 225 more. It neighbors the Russian Federation for 2484 kilometers as well as Belarus, Moldova, and four members of NATO (Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia), totaling near 7700 kilometers.

Both Ukrainian and international leaders have envisioned Ukraine as a European state in the future. During the 1990s Ukraine became a founding member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, it participated in NATO peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, and it signed a "cooperation agreement with NATO's highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council" in 1997. In May 2002, Ukraine signaled that it would also like to pursue full NATO membership. Receptively, "NATO has long said Ukraine's geographic position, between NATO and Russia, is important in constructing a stable security system for Europe."¹⁴³ United States President George W. Bush, while speaking in Poland stated, "The Europe we are building must include Ukraine, a nation struggling with the trauma of transition. Some in Kiev speak of Ukraine's European

¹⁴² CIA, "Ukraine," The World Factbook 2002, Accessed online 13 November 2002, <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/up.html>>.

¹⁴³ Askold Krushelnysky, "Ukraine: Kyiv, In Policy Shift, Seeks NATO Membership," Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 29 May 2002. Accessed online, <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/05/29052002155351.asp>>.

destiny. If this is their aspiration, we should reward it.”¹⁴⁴ Whether or not Ukraine fully intends to join Europe as a full-fledged participating member depends more on Kiev’s political actions and economic capabilities than upon their geographic location.

b. Natural Resources

Besides Ukraine’s strategic location, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was judged to be in excellent shape for a transition to western practices mainly due to its land and its natural resources. Despite wavering political decisions and economic reforms, the wealth of the land continues to provide promise for the future. Iron ore, coal, manganese, natural gas, oil, salt, sulfur, graphite, titanium, magnesium, kaolin, nickel, mercury, and timber are mined for export. With fifty-eight percent of its black-earth arable, Ukraine continues to produce grain, sugar beets, sunflower seeds, vegetables, beef, and milk. Effective land management and better production techniques, coupled with useful export markets, would provide Ukraine a greater amount of hard currency that it desperately needs for debt reduction and infrastructure modernization.

c. Infrastructure and Industry

Ukraine continues to suffer from the inherited decay of communism. Although it assumed a substantial industrial infrastructure (one that supported the USSR and the Red Army), Ukraine’s industry needed to be overhauled to meet the new challenges of independence. Although its heavy industry still caters to the construction and repair of Soviet-style armaments, Kiev realized that it needed to diversify in production and quality. When Ukraine became independent, over eighty percent “of its industrial enterprises lacked important components of the technological cycle and badly needed renovation of their technological structure or even radical reconstruction.”¹⁴⁵

The nation’s energy infrastructure and policies, which became thoroughly convoluted during the Soviet era, are still impacting Ukrainian economic health and

¹⁴⁴ George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University, Warsaw, Poland on 15 June 2001. Accessed online, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html>>.

¹⁴⁵ The Embassy of Ukraine, “Doing Business in Ukraine: Guide for Foreign Investors,” Washington, D.C. 1999. Accessed on line 21 November 2002, <http://www.ukrembassy.hinet.hr/economy/econ_0004.htm>.

security and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Though the nation is rich in natural gas, oil, and coal, the residual Soviet infrastructure of production, distribution, importation, exportation, and consumption continues to be extremely out-of-balance. Political indecision, lack of personal and business capital, and corruption continue to erect formidable barriers to any long-term viability options that are required of this vital industry.

2. Domestic Influences and Political Tendencies

Many pundits explain Ukraine's difficulties in fortifying its economic, political, and military strength as being due to the contrasting desires of two extremes -- the nationalists in the western provinces versus the Russophiles in Crimea and the eastern provinces -- competing to gain the political support of the center populous. Though the nationalist forces were instrumental in the drive to gain independence from the communist Soviet Union, today's Ukrainian political discourse also entails a struggle between those who advocate reform versus those who seek to maintain their hold on power. Two issues factor heavily into this position: first, a lack of societal organization, which facilitates voter apathy on national and international matters and second, a political hierarchy that willingly takes advantage of the voter apathy, promising reforms to attain power but rescinding those promises to facilitate their political livelihood.

a. Lack of Civil Society

One of the onerous residual effects of the many years under the Russian empire and the Soviet Union is the inability of the populations to develop institutions of civil society. With the lack of civil society, Ukrainians have been slow to organize and have been unable to effectively promote democratic institutions or challenge "the rule of deeply corrupt, short-sighted, and incompetent elites."¹⁴⁶ Because of an undeveloped ability to organize and confront the ruling elites on unpopular issues, Ukraine has, for the better part of the last decade, fallen into a rut that minimizes the public's ability to affect public policy.

In some instances, the inability to effectively challenge the central rule can be the lesser of two evils, especially in a newly democratizing state where public opinion

¹⁴⁶ Lieven, p. 52.

can sometimes be whipped up for extremist purposes by a radical minority. In other instances, the same inability to organize allows for corrupt rule to remain unchecked. As Dmitry Kornilov, a Russian nationalist in Donetsk, Ukraine, opined, “the parties of power here, the bureaucrats-politicians and their business allies, are terrified of political parties, which would mean that elections would lead to genuine changes of power – *their* power.”¹⁴⁷ Similar vents of frustration emanate from the western provinces as well, usually focusing upon the nationalist sentiment. Thus, the eminent problem that Ukraine faces is the lack of a “national” civil society as opposed to the readily vibrant “nationalist” civil society.

b. Failed Political and Economic Reforms

A short review of the major political and economic reforms during the 1990s illustrates the problems and challenges that Ukraine faces in the upcoming years. In 1991, Kravchuk, supported by the nationalists from the western provinces, set about on a course that attempted to make a clean break from the Soviet dominance. Using the CIS as a framework for a civilized divorce, Ukraine undertook several initiatives to delineate their differences. It constructed friendly working relations with all republics of the former Soviet Union as it resisted efforts to make the CIS into another iteration of the Soviet Union. Soon after independence, Ukraine looked to the West and the international community for support. It willingly gave up its tactical nuclear shells to Russia, it eventually surrendered its strategic nuclear weaponry after gaining some western security assurances and monetary support, and it proclaimed itself neutral but then actively took part in NATO-led exercises. Mounting fuel debts coupled with their entwined infrastructure with Russia, however, quickly closed any window of opportunity for a Ukraine to make a clean break from Russian economic influences.

The state economy faltered under the failed central economic planning left over from the Soviet Union as the ex-communists moved into control of the Rada. One day, the communists controlled the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Ukraine, practically the next day the same individuals were elected to the Rada. Loosening of the centrally planned economy with market liberalization, however small, provided those with the capability from the beginning to cash in on the opportunity. Most other

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 54.

Ukrainians saw “sausage issues” and their relative decline (factors affecting the quality of everyday life) take precedence over issues of strategic position, NATO inclusion, and, to some extent, the “pointlessness of democracy.”¹⁴⁸

The political and economic reforms deemed necessary for western investment were short-circuited from the start by “oligarchic centrist political forces.” Allied with whoever was in the seat of the presidency, the oligarchs “control the government and parliamentary leadership” and “espouse the rhetoric of reform and integration into Europe, but are not willing to undertake the domestic reforms prerequisite to membership.”¹⁴⁹

The 1994 presidential election pitted President Kravchuk against Prime Minister Kuchma in the context of worsening economic conditions. Promised economic reforms after 1991 never materialized in theory or practice. Kravchuk continued to run on a pro-independence platform, though somewhat tempered from 1992. Kuchma, on the other hand, ran on a platform that claimed an independent state but one that was realistic in its assessment of Russian influence. Kuchma won the election promising “an official status for the Russian language, better relations and more-open borders with Russia, and a Ukrainian constitution with more powers for the regions. None of these promises have been kept.”¹⁵⁰

Despite his election promises, Kuchma soon embarked upon a governing style that indicated his understanding of pragmatic rule – enact executive decisions and guide legislative acts that do not tip the balance too far from the political center. The Ukrainian center of gravity since independence is the power of the ex-communist business oligarchs. Political decisions emanating from Kiev would usually have the oligarchs’ business interests in mind, even if such decisions require closer collaboration with Moscow and away from western integration. Arriving in office, Kuchma publicly stated his desire to integrate the economy along western ideals. He lost the opportunity when he failed to enact meaningful reforms during the first four years of his

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁴⁹ Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine-EU: A Troubled Relationship,” *Russia and Eurasia Review*, vol 1, issue 3, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 2 July 2002. Accessed online, <http://Russia.Jamestown.org/pubs/view/rer_001_003_002.htm>.

administration, allowing the oligarchs to solidify their grip on the organs of the economy. Kuchma gave up on his electoral position of gaining official recognition for Russian language due to nationalist pressure from the western provinces, ensuring that he did not alienate the nationalists who are the most organized and vocal polity within Ukraine.

In the foreign policy arena, “Ukraine’s leaders have repeatedly claimed that its foreign policy is neither pro-Western or pro-Russian, but pro-Ukrainian,” but journalist Taras Kuzio defines it more as “pro-Kuchma.”¹⁵¹ To his credit, Kuchma managed some major political successes abroad, specifically, acquiring Western assurances in return for the strategic nuclear weapons, ushering the completion of the Black Sea Fleet Accords (though the measure postponed important territorial sovereignty issues), and the signing of the 1997 Treaty for Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Russia and Ukraine.

The basis of all three of the above successes was willingness to do what Russia asked as a requirement to retire official Ukrainian energy debts or provide required fuel in exchange for increased business and economic integration between Ukraine and Russia. Because of such agreements, the Ukrainian ex-communist oligarchs fortified their positions of wealth and power while Kuchma remained seated as President. Since Ukraine and Russia are both “privatized states” in which “the state functions to defend the interests of a small capitalist class,” the Ukrainian business energy barons directed the foreign policy inclinations to where they were best suited. In the early years, that direction was toward Russia. When the Russian oligarchs wanted more from the Ukrainian barons than what was expected, the Ukrainians shifted their business interests (and thereby the foreign policy interests) toward the West.¹⁵²

Although Ukraine has searched for further integration with the West on both economic and military matters, specifically seeking NATO inclusion in 2002, Kuchma’s personal past infractions have been detrimental to Ukrainian western

¹⁵⁰ Lieven, p. 69.

¹⁵¹ Kuzio.

¹⁵² For an in-depth analysis of Kuchma’s lateral shift from a pro-Russian stance toward a pro-Western stance, the thesis recommends Tor Bukvoll’s “Defining a Ukrainian Foreign Policy Identity: Business Interests and Geopolitics in the Formulation of Ukrainian Foreign Policy 1994-1999,” in Moroney, et al, *Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy*, pp.131-153.

integration. Tainted by official scandals and corruption, the Ukrainian international image has become tarnished. The September 2000 murder and beheading of the opposition journalist Grigory Gongadze, coupled with a cassette tape linking Kuchma to the crime, has cast a shadow on the Ukrainian president. The March 2002 legislative elections were deemed “only partially free and fair.” Kuchma’s tactic of “forcing businessmen to join his United Ukraine faction (his political party) to make it the largest as a way to have the head of the presidential administration elected parliamentary speaker has only served to confirm the view that Kuchma’s domestic policies are at odds with his pro-EU (European Union) rhetoric.” Other instances of “high levels of corruption, arms trafficking, ...and one of the worst records in Europe of attacks on the media” have further challenged Kuchma’s standing within the West.¹⁵³

Because of Kuchma’s tainted history and an unwillingness to implement the needed reforms – ranging from economic to societal to judicial -- the West has rebuffed Ukrainian approaches (witness NATO’s official non-invitation passed to Kuchma during 2002 NATO summit in Prague). The West prefers to have Kuchma prove them wrong in their assessments of the Ukrainian president through positive actions as opposed to his usual empty rhetoric. If the reforms do not materialize, the West could possibly disengage entirely from Ukrainian affairs until the 2004 presidential election results are known. Domestic political challenges arise from a somewhat unraveled collection of interests in which the West pins most of its hopes upon the success of reform-minded former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko.

C. RUSSIAN POLITICAL PROJECTS¹⁵⁴

Leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the socialist experiment and the republics’ travails led many to view the past as “seventy years on the road to nowhere.”¹⁵⁵ The totality of control within the Communist experiment ensured that

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ In this thesis a “project” is the collection of individuals who coalesce around their common understanding and idea in regards to a particular issue. The project in and of itself maintains no organization or structure as found in a political party. However, those individuals ascribing to a project could simultaneously align themselves with a political party that fosters the same ideas. Subsequently, just as a political party can “make a decision” or “choose a leader,” the thesis also applies the same personifying trait upon the five projects.

¹⁵⁵ Malia, p. 510.

when the system staggered, the entire state staggered for the scheme “had been a ‘mono-organizational’ system in which everything, from Party to Plan to political police, had been structurally and functionally interrelated.”¹⁵⁶ Coupled with the complete collapse of the system was the need to “create a Russian nation-state” since “no such entity as the post-1991 Russian Federation existed before the fall of Communism.”¹⁵⁷ Though not fully accepted by all historians or political scientists, the argument is convincing that “ever since Ivan the Terrible conquered the Volga Khanates in the Sixteenth Century, the state that was ruled from Moscow and St. Petersburg never was a nation-state; it was a multinational empire whose principle of cohesion until 1917 had been dynastic, and after that date had been the Party.”¹⁵⁸ The complexity of the Russian situation is that, not only does the Russian Federation and its ruling elite have to manage the domestic and international affairs of state, but it must also, simultaneously, help shape how the Russian people envision themselves in the future.

With the fall of the ever-dominant CPSU and the subsequent rise of the Russian Federation, internal challenges to the existing state control emerged from different sectors of society. As the Russian political system continues to develop, it has in the past decade and will within the coming years coalesce around shared values and splinter on contentious issues. Russia, like Ukraine, is still somewhat in its infancy as a fully independent nation-state. With its relative newness, the domestic political voices, loud and opinionated on many issues, continue to amalgamate around core beliefs and public policy. With the passage of time and subsequent political victories and/or defeats, the many voices of the many political movements will find common issues and will solidify themselves into viable political parties.

The thesis examines five different projects of nation building¹⁵⁹ concerning the Russian perspective on what Russia is as a nation and how that nation should view other Russians within the “near abroad.” Since the Russian Federation is still relatively new in existence, the development and edification of political parties is still an on-going process

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 506.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 507.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Igor Zevelev, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington,

and one that has improved since 1991.¹⁶⁰ Without having the history that galvanizes the party system, the electorate tends to rally around issues that concern them instead of time-tested political parties.¹⁶¹ As a result, this thesis analyzes Russian political opinion in terms of “projects” rather than parties. After detailing a project’s inclinations and purposes, the author of the thesis applies Glaser’s adversary labels to each project by assessing that project’s threat to the Ukrainian state.

1. New-State Building

Of the five different projects that emerged during the 1990s, the “new state builders” were the dominant voices within the official policy of the Russian Federation. The project decided to work with the given conditions of the Russian Federation of 1991. It was and is a proponent for the “creation and stabilization of new state institutions within the borders of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic), inviolability of the borders between the former Soviet republics, and development of relations with neighboring states as fully independent entities.”¹⁶² A pragmatic understanding of this attitude was that since Yeltsin gained international support for the Russian Federation in the early 1990s, the same international community granted an equitable decree of autonomy to all other states of the FSU. Yeltsin could not, without a 180-degree reversal, turn his back on the expressed declarations of the international community without facing possible international condemnation. Yeltsin, as a realistic individual, decided to work with what he had helped create within the confines of international concurrence.

The project dealt with the problems of Russian ethnic identity in a practical manner, determining that there were more important issues. It promoted civic identities while de-emphasizing arguments of others that stated that the “Bolshevik-drawn borders” between the republics were inherently artificial and should expand to incorporate the domain of “Russian culture, language, religion, and traditions.” The project encouraged the other NIS to integrate the Russian minorities into their societies while speaking up for the Russians human rights, and if need be, helping those that chose to migrate to

D.C. Press, 2001, pp. 67-89.

¹⁶⁰ Thomas F. Remington, *Politics in Russia*, Longman, New York, 1999, p. 116.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 145.

¹⁶² Zevelev, p. 68.

Russia.¹⁶³ The political constituencies for the “new state builders” were the intelligentsia of the major urban areas as well as the Russian Federation *nomenklatura*; each constituency joined for totally different reasons. The intelligentsia wanted a “quick and radical transformation from the communist state to a democratic system,” while the *nomenklatura*, consisting of high-ranking former CPSU and state officials, wanted to rid themselves of the “all-union state apparatus and establish its full control over Russia’s resources.”¹⁶⁴

Throughout the decade, the new state builders, in efforts to improve their political numbers, allied themselves with smaller liberal parties that advocated separation from the other Soviet successor states even while supporting the human rights and cultural needs of “compatriots abroad.”¹⁶⁵ Implementing their realistic understanding of their economic conditions as left by the Soviet era, they fostered programs that provided for the necessary economic integration among CIS states.¹⁶⁶

When Glaser’s model is applied to the “new state building” project and those that support such tactics, the adversary posed to Ukraine is relatively straightforward in its intent and conducive to Ukraine’s overall security. In other words, the new state builders in Russia could be classified as an ally of Ukrainian independence. The new state builders are *not greedy* as they respect the inviolability of the borders between Russia and Ukraine. The new state builders are *secure* in their understanding that the Ukrainian leadership does not pose any threat to their ability to stay in power or drastically threaten vested interests of the intelligentsia or the *nomenklatura*. They are *clear-sighted* toward the Ukrainian situation as both states continue to struggle to improve their economic situations. However, certain proponents among the new state builders, can, if left unchecked, threaten Ukraine’s economic independence, and therefore threaten Ukraine’s security. The only measurable threat that the new state builders can pose to the long-term security and independence of Ukraine is if Ukraine becomes economically viable apart

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 87.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

from the economic health of the Russian Federation, thereby infringing upon the livelihood and vested interests of the *nomenklatura*.

One of the greater effects upon the new state builders is their reliance upon the moral and economic support of the international community and the West. If they violate the principles of self-determination of Ukrainians, they lose the support of the nations that in theory support the intelligentsia. If the *nomenklatura* violate voluntary Ukrainian efforts that attempt to establish economic independence and full integration in the world market, then the international economic structures may withdraw their support from the Russian Federation. These international factors, more than anything, restrict the new state builders from going too far in encroaching upon Ukrainian interests.

2. Ethnonationalism

The main concept behind the ethnonationalism project is the “importance of Russian ethnicity for state and nation building.”¹⁶⁷ The political program of the ethnonationalists is to “unite Russia with Russian communities in the near abroad and build the Russian state within the area of settlement of the Russian people and other Eastern Slavs.”¹⁶⁸

The Russian ethnonationalists had appeared in the beginning of the Twentieth Century and “advocated unconditional primacy of ethnic Russians in the empire.” Militant and extremist in action and thought, the early ethnonationalists were represented by four major groups -- the Russian Assembly, the Russian Monarchist Party, the Union of Russian People, and the Mikhail Archangel Russian People’s Party. The latter’s program stated in 1908 that “The Russian People...has the right to be a prime, ruling people in the state’s life, even more so in the state’s creative transformations. The Russian language is a dominant language in all domains of the indivisible Russian Empire.”¹⁶⁹

The super-Russian credo remains current today, however a marked difference between the two eras stipulates that the early ethnonationalists wanted to maintain the

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 66.

empire “while the modern Russian ethnonationalists argue that the empire was a burden for the Russian people.”¹⁷⁰ During the 1990s there were also moderate and extremist ethnonationalistic groups. From 1991 through 1993, the Christian Democratic Party and the Constitutional Democratic Party represented moderate faction. In the early 1990s, extremist groups, exemplified by the Pamyat, formed to promote the ethnonationalist credo. Following Yeltsin’s September-October 1993 assault on the parliament, the Russian President quickly branded and outlawed all ethnonationalists after their “well-organized” support of the rebellious legislature. After the banishment, the movement lost overt support until 1995.¹⁷¹

From 1995-1998, different factions of the ethnonationalism sentiment emerged and solidified behind strong and vocal leaders. Derzhava, which was led by Aleksandr Rutskoi,¹⁷² and the extremist National Republican party, headed by Nikolai Lysenko, pulled the ethnonationalist vote apart, mainly due to the extremists’ complete rejection of “western values” dealing with “democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”¹⁷³ After a number of weak electoral showings, especially in the 1996 presidential race,¹⁷⁴ the ethnonationalist party leaders were unable to overcome differences among themselves and therefore left the sizeable minority bloc without representation in the congress. Despite an insignificant showing within national elections, the ethnonationalist movement continues to have support throughout segments of society including “representatives of the intelligentsia (mainly from small and medium-size Russian cities,

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁷² Aleksandr Rutskoi, who at one time was Boris Yeltsin’s vice-president, gravitated amongst different political parties throughout the 1990s. As Vice President of the Russian Federation, he denounced Yeltsin’s 1992 economic “shock therapy” reform plan as economic suicide.” See Remington, p. 44. During the 1993 White House revolt, Rutskoi was declared president by the “rump congress.” With the eventual collapse of the revolt, Rutskoi was arrested with the other hard-line leaders. He was released in 1994 under an amnesty plan but remained Yeltsin’s chief critic. In 1995 he nominated by the Derzhava (Strong State) Party “a loose coalition of ex-Communists and other hard-liners” as its presidential candidate in the 1996 election, but he withdrew in favor of Gennady Zyuganov. Family Education Network, accessed online 19 November 2002, <<http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/people/A0842776.html>>.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Remington, p. 162.

as well as from the countryside), the Cossacks, dislocated workers, and part of the new entrepreneurial class.”¹⁷⁵

The most significant proponent of ethnonationalism from the intelligentsia is Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who “is not ashamed of being Russian” and is most “concerned with the preservation of his people, which, according to him, was almost ruined by the self-imposed burden of empire.”¹⁷⁶ Because of Solzhenitsyn’s political *gravitas*, his views are likely to get at minimum a respectful hearing from all leaders with populations that might be affected by his views. Instead of demanding the reestablishment of a Russian empire, he “prescribes different policies” for different groups of Russians within the near abroad.

He proposes the evacuation of those Russians from Central Asia and Transcaucasia who wish to leave those countries, while advocating dual citizenship to those who stay behind. He also urges Russian leaders to demand from the Baltic States compliance with international standards of national minority rights. Finally, and most important, Solzhenitsyn advocates that leaders work toward “possible degrees of unification in various areas with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, and strive, at the very least, for ‘invisible’ borders.”¹⁷⁷

By taking Solzhenitsyn at face value and applying a logical deduction of his ideas, Ukraine and other NIS with sizeable Russian minorities should understand that distinguished illuminati in Russia harbor designs upon Ukrainian sovereign territory. The international lines that ethnonationalists want to redraw do not mirror those of the neo-imperialists or those that advocate the restoration of the Soviet Union or an empire along those lines. Though there are advocates of a more extremist plan than that of Solzhenitsyn, such as Nikolai Pavlov of the National-Republican Party of Russia, most ethnonationalists base their foreign policy on “the firm belief that reunification of the Russian people is natural and inevitable, and that until the Russian question is resolved,

¹⁷⁵ Zevelev, p. 70.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 54.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. Zevelev’s portrayal of theoretical ethnonationalism pulls extensively from Solzhenitsyn’s *The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century*, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, 1995. The enclosed quote is from p. 94 of Solzhenitsyn’s book.

international stability is impossible.”¹⁷⁸ Focusing upon the West Germany’s successful “wait-it-out” policy in its denial of recognizing the legitimacy of East Germany, Nataliya Narochnitskaya stipulates that the Russian government should not forge any “international treaties and agreements, conventions and multilateral documents” that would legitimize “the current state of the Russian people, and the seizure of its historic long-standing territories and sacred things.”¹⁷⁹

The poor showing of ethnonationalists in recent Russian elections should not give Ukrainians a false sense of security. If the Russian Federation domestic situation worsens to a greater degree, often the first vocal cry of the ruling elite is to blame some outsiders for their troubles. Usually the “others” will be differentiated by race or ethnicity as exemplified throughout many battlefronts during the Second World War and more recently in the Balkans. Lieven determines that in the past, Russians have not “seen themselves as an ethnic nation” as have the Balts, Caucasians, and Ukrainians as each of the countries have coalesced around an ethnicity to distinguish themselves from the great Russian. He further states, “The danger is that precisely these examples on their [Russian] borders may lead Russians to adopt this type of self-definition” which could kindle the ethnic flames.¹⁸⁰

The ethnonationalists present Ukraine with an adversary that is *greedy* in its desire to unite ethnic Russians of Ukraine as well as striving to reacquire under the Russian banner all of the “historic long-standing territories and sacred things” of by-gone Russia. Such territories would, by all accounts, include the Southern Steppe and the Crimean peninsula. They are *insecure* in their present standing since they believe that the present political situations place their Russian brethren in harmful circumstances and thereby dominated by non-Russians. To make matters worse for the Ukrainian leadership, the Russian ethnonationalists are *myopic* in their views of other nationalities and geo-political situations. Though they may be willing to wait, à la West Germany, they still do not accept the current conditions of Russians abroad as any thing but a

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 56 wherein Zevelev quotes Nataliya Narochnitskaya, “Rossiya i russkie v mirovoy istorii,” *Mezhdunarodnaya zhishn’* no. 3, 1996, p. 76.

¹⁸⁰ Lieven, p. 144.

temporary circumstance that will change, in time, in their favor. This myopic perspective could lead to two possible misperceptions of Ukraine's intentions and capabilities. The first is that it could cause the Russians to overestimate Ukraine's capabilities and determination, thus causing Russia to move toward a more deliberate approach. The second is that the clouded understanding makes the Russians underestimate the Ukrainian resolve, leading Russia to be aggressive toward Ukraine without acknowledging how this might produce an aggressive response by Ukraine, which then escalates to greater aggression by both sides.

3. Restorationism

Hardly varying in form from the pre-1917 imperialism,¹⁸¹ the main aim of the restorationism project is "to restore a state within the borders of the USSR" which, by design, would also resolve the Russian Diaspora. The restorationists of the Russian Federation would, however, choose to take more active measures to support the Russian population in the near abroad prior to the re-establishment of the Union. Such actions would include "economic sanctions and threats of military intervention." Upon the re-establishment of the Soviet Union, the new Union would be based upon administrative *guberniyas*¹⁸² as opposed to the nationalized, ethnic-derived states established by Lenin and Stalin.¹⁸³

Political support for the restorationism project "includes a considerable part of the Russian military and security agencies, the former Soviet nomenklatura, and ordinary Russians who miss the glory of the former empire and the superpower status enjoyed by the Soviet Union." The restorationists are modernizers at heart, ensuring that the new Union would be militarily strong and effective and that the "development of industry in large urban centers" would sufficiently build the "empire with shining palaces of

¹⁸¹ Zevelev, p. 71.

¹⁸² "In Imperial Russia, the huge vast Russian empire was split into a series of regional governments, called, in Russian, "Guberniyas". These could be thought of, perhaps, as the equivalent of states within the US, (although they were not autonomous at all). In 1857 there were sixty different guberniyas, each one of which was assigned a number to be printed in the middle of the original "dot cancel" post marks. By 1917, this number had increased to 101. Each *Guberniya* typically comprised of a number of sub-regions, which were usually called *uyezds* or districts. And, within each *uyezd* may be a number of sub-districts, which were usually called *volosts*. In 1917, the 101 *guberniyas* had 812 *uyezds* within them, and the 812 *uyezds* had 16,760 *volosts*." Glossary of Philatelic Terms, accessed online 19 November 2002, <<http://www.rossia.com/stamps/glossary/glossary.asp>>.

¹⁸³ Zevelev, p. 71.

Petersburg, great historical traditions and achievements, thinkers of genius and the leading culture.”¹⁸⁴

Recent military endeavors, especially the armed travails in Chechnya during 1994 through 1996 and again starting in 1999, have tempered the restorationists’ understanding of their capabilities as well as diminished their public appeal. Future military success, however, could reinvigorate sectors of the elite toward the restorationism project and breathe new life into the ideal.¹⁸⁵

The restorationism project within Russia presents Ukraine with another adversary that, if empowered, would be *always secure* and *greedy*. The Restorationists are *always secure* because it is within their mantra to ensure that the state would have the military capabilities to maintain control over the empire -- there would be no internal dissent in ensuring the supreme capabilities of their military. They would also be *greedy* in the obvious characteristic that their empire would include the land and belongings of the Russian Empire or of the Soviet Union. In both cases, present-day Ukraine would be reabsorbed into the restored empire. The restorationists’ approach to the geo-strategic situation of Ukraine could be seen as both *clear-sighted* and *myopic*. They are *clear-sighted* in the respect that they fully understand that in order to implement their offensive measures, they must first understand the defense capabilities of Ukraine. After determining what Ukraine can do to stop a possible conquest, the restorationists would then apply the required amount of offensive military capability to meet the need of imperial conquest. However, restorationists are extremely *myopic* in not comprehending the negative reactions, wrought by their aggressive military strategy, from the international community.

4. Hegemony and Dominance

Very similar to those who espouse the restorationist approach of imperialism is the “hegemony-and-dominance” political faction. According to Antonio Gramsci’s theory, a country “becomes hegemonic because other actors willingly or subconsciously defer to it, even if they wish to do otherwise. The followers comply because they see

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. pp. 71, 72.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

both the leader's policy position and its putative power as legitimate."¹⁸⁶ The project intends to build the state "within the borders of present-day Russia accompanied by subjugation of other successor states and the creation of a buffer zone of protectorates and dependent countries around Russia."¹⁸⁷

As the hegemonic supporters view the Diaspora, the Russians in the "near abroad" present an issue that can be exploited to their favor. Two main individuals have carried the issue toward the brink of policy. The first one is Yuri Luzhkov, leader of the Fatherland Party and the mayor of Moscow,¹⁸⁸ who openly declared while in Ukraine "No Russian will be comfortable until Sevastopol is returned to the Russian Federation.... Sevastopol is a city of Russian glory. It was and remains a Russian city and we should defend its right to be a Russian city."¹⁸⁹ The second influential member of the "hegemony-and dominance" project is Luzhkov's political mentor, Konstantin Zatulin, who in 1997 authored a "bold" report on Russia's stance toward the CIS. The "report's explicitly hegemonic approach" stipulated that Russia could replace its official integrationalist policies with more aggressive ones "in order to prevent the Soviet successor states' anti-Russian policies" by encouraging "political instability and interethnic tensions." Though the Kremlin officially rebuked the report, parts of it were included in President Yeltsin's "behind closed doors" speech during the May 1997 CIS summit. In November 1998, Zatulin was elected chairman of the Derzhava movement, thereby acquiring the "hegemony and dominance" project a party base formerly controlled by the restorationists.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁶ Zevelev, p. 72.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 73.

¹⁸⁸ The cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg have the status of regions and are therefore "treated as subjects of the Federation along with the other republics and regions, with the chief executives and the chairs of their legislative assemblies serving as members of the Federation Council." Thus, as mayor of Moscow, Luzhkov "wields a great deal of political power at the level of the federal government." It was from this seat, that Luzhkov unsuccessfully ran against Vladimir Putin for the Russian Federation presidency in 2000. Remington, p. 64. Luzhkov's presidential run was short-lived as the soon race developed as a show between Putin and Communist Party chief Gennady Zyuganov. See Sergei Blagov, "Putin's Election a Triumph for the Strongman," *Asia Times*, 28 March 2000, <<http://www.atimes.com/c-asia/BC30Ag02.html>>.

¹⁸⁹ Lieven, p. 125.

¹⁹⁰ Zevelev, p. 73.

Besides being supported by a portion of the nomenklatura, the major constituents of the project include many who favor the idea of imperialism. It is perceived that “dominance over the near abroad is the first step toward empire.” With such an understanding of the desired “dominance” progression, the type of adversary that the hegemonic project shows is very similar to the restorationist -- *always secure, greedy, and clear-sighted*. The measure of clear-sightedness could be argued, as it appears that the supporter of the “hegemonic” project could take more risks in its foreign policy toward Ukraine by pushing for more aggressive tactics. These aggressive tactics by a Russian hegemonic power could provoke returned aggression from Ukraine, but also, more importantly, a harsh response from the West. Thus, the clear-sighted label could be clouded by the dominator’s aggressive drive toward reestablishment of the empire. And because of this semi-clouding of its full vision and understanding of capabilities and intentions, the thesis deduces that the hegemonic project is a greater risk to Ukraine than would be the restorationist.

5. Integrationalism

The fifth and final project is Integrationalism. It favors “the promotion of economic reintegration, which could lead to similar coordination of defense and other policies.... The project is very pragmatic, emphasizing economy and security and downplaying more abstract components, such as identity, ethnicity, and nationhood.” The project “recognizes the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders” of “fully sovereign, independent states” while stipulating the need “for some supranational institutions, controlled economic reintegration, and maintenance of major symbols of political sovereignty, accompanied by a high level of cooperation.”¹⁹¹

Such integrationist ideas were proposed in the early years of the CIS, as evidenced by the plan presented by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev. His June 1994 “Eurasian Union” was coolly rejected by many of the NIS, which had only recently escaped from the Soviet rule.¹⁹² Besides the independent states that still may want to remain independent from Russia or possibly align themselves with the West, opposition to the integrationist project include: Russian elites that do not want to subsidize weaker

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁹² Ibid.

states, differences in economic reforms that have occurred since 1991, and western influences that “fear Russian domination (over the NIS) disguised under an integrationalist veil.”¹⁹³

The proponents of the integrationalist project are those that were adversely affected “by the severing of the economic ties among the former Soviet republics, especially in heavy and defense-related industries.” Additionally, those Russian individuals that “not only miss the glory of the former superpower but also are also nostalgic about the multinational country that they used to live in and had loyalty to” support the project.¹⁹⁴ Zevelev situated the reformists of Gorbachev’s era within the integrationalist project, wherein the Union was not dismantled, but was readjusted to incorporate the sovereignty of states while maintaining the need for concerted efforts of the sovereigns.¹⁹⁵

In the theoretical realm, an *always secure, not greedy, and clear-sighted* adversary would face Ukraine if the integrationalist project were adopted in Russia. It would be *secure* in its borders, not fearing the aggressive capabilities of other states from the “near abroad.” The integrationalist government, understanding the need to promote the sovereignty of borders, would ensure that its own borders are well maintained and differentiated. An integrationalist Russia would not advertently seek “non-security expansion” that “increases its wealth and/or prestige,”¹⁹⁶ since it would realize the practical benefits of indiscriminate free trade and sovereignty if enjoyed by all confederation members. Russia would be considered a *clear-sighted* adversary since through its trade and dealings with the “near abroad” it would understand Ukraine’s position, both its strengths and weaknesses. Within theory, Russia would be secure, knowing that its borders are safe and that nationalism fever would be tamed in favor of state sovereignty and economic strength.

But the fact is that Russia would be the dominant force within an economically and militarily integrated system of the states of the FSU. Unless the smaller states can

¹⁹³ Ibid. p. 75.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁹⁶ Glaser, p. 501.

become autonomously stronger without the assistance from Russia, the size and resource differences would arbitrarily sway toward Russia's favor. This leads to the subsequent deduction that Russian interests would trump sovereignty issues of the smaller state. It is because of the actual size difference between Russia and Ukraine, an integrationalist approach that keeps the two states as equal sovereigns is not realistically possible, thus Russia, without intending to tread upon its partners would default to the *greedy* label – but to a lesser extent than the more nationalist projects.

6. Coalitions within Russian Politics

With different interpretations of history and the travails as well as the glories experienced by Russians of the past, citizens of the present the Russian Federation have coalesced around varying core beliefs. Those same core beliefs, due to domestic power struggles and internecine fighting, have shifting standard bearers and political leaders. However, each faction clearly wants its ideas to triumph in the electoral process.

Since there can only be one president of the country at a time, for political expediency the varying projects form coalitions in which their differences are temporarily set aside and commonalities are promoted. The strength and electoral success of the political coalition will help determine the longevity of the coalition. Since independence, the Russian collations have basically established themselves along the context of accepting the borders of the Russian Federation or rejecting the agreed borders.

From 1989 through 1991, during the Soviet Union's dissolution, “new state builders” and ethnonationalists aligned themselves tactically since both used the same slogans to promote the “sovereignty of the RSFSR” apart from the Soviet Union. Towards the end of decade, the solidarity of the coalition diminished as the “ethnonationalists had become marginalized in the Russian political arena. The reason for this is more structural than purely political: it is the weak Russian ethnic identity.”¹⁹⁷ Today, restorationists and ethnonationalists comprise the coalition that seeks to redefine the present borders. The ethnonationalists want all Russians joined, which would exclude western portions of Ukraine, while the restorationists want international borders similar

¹⁹⁷ Zevelev, p. 81.

to those of the Empire or the Soviet Union.¹⁹⁸ Though their political power decreased throughout the 1990s, the rhetoric of the ethnonationalists and a resulting “incorporation of their ideas by major opposition parties”¹⁹⁹ continue to keep their project and its leaders within the political limelight. Coupled with this coalition are elements of the “hegemony and dominance” project. Though advocating sovereign states, the “dominators” and business oligarchs blur the line between the ideal of maintaining strict sovereignty and the ideal that promotes the “creation of buffer zones and dependent countries around Russia.”²⁰⁰

At the other end of the spectrum, the integrationalists and the “new state builders” move forward within the defined sovereign borders. Both “favor civic identities, are moderate on the diaspora issue, and tacitly acknowledge the fact that Russia simply has no strength for a more ambitious and assertive policy in the near abroad.” Differences between the two projects usually rest on the amount of economic integration; integrationalists promoting such economic and possibly military ties while other liberal factions preferring greater sovereignty, bordering upon isolationism.²⁰¹

Table 3. Selected Political Parties and Movements in 1999 Duma Election²⁰²

Project	New state building	Ethnonationalism	Restorationalism	Integrationalism	Domination
Parties and % of vote	Unity/23.3 OVR/13.3 SPS/8.5 Yabloko/5.9	KRO/ 0.6	KRPF/24.3 BZ/6.0	(OVR)* (Yabloko) (KRO)	(OVR)

*(Indicate that the given perspective is present in the program of the party as a secondary issue).

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 80.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 84.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 73,

²⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 86, 87.

²⁰² Assignments of parties to projects from Zevelev, pp. 78,79. Percentage of votes per political parties from Electionworld.org, “Elections in Russia.” Accessed online 5 December 2002, <<http://www.electionworld.org/election/russia.htm>, Version: 10/08/2002 13:44:21>.

In the parliamentary elections to the Russian Duma, the numerous political parties basically aligned themselves around two poles: those that wanted a restoration of the Union, led by the restorationists and joined by the ethnonationalists, and those that wanted to keep the Russian Federation within its present bounds, led by the “new state builders” and joined by the integrationists and the dominators. The restorationists acquired 30.9 percent of the vote while the new state builders and integrationists garnered 51.0 percent.

7. Present Russian Leadership

Determining where the Putin administration falls in the spectrum is an ongoing endeavor. Past political decisions of the Putin administration, such as cracking down on the opposition press and instituting modest military reforms in the Russian Armed Forces, afford an understanding of their first concern -- establishing a firm control over the internal organs of the state and thereby improving their domestic position. President Putin has aligned himself with the interests of the nomenklatura and the Russian energy oligarchs, understanding that their support solidifies his position of strength domestically and internationally. Putin gains domestically because the nomenklatura are still the power brokers at the national and regional level.²⁰³ He gains internationally because the nomenklatura continue to hold the reigns in the energy sectors -- whose potential growth, modernization, and export capability is the most promising source of extensive commerce with western interests. With this understood, this author states that the Russian leadership is domestically secure in its strength and continuing to cement its power.

The second concern of the Putin administration, with a realistic understanding of the Russian economy and military strength, is to shrewdly ensure that Russia acquires the best possible arrangement when dealing internationally, and that goes for the NIS as well as the United States. Despite Putin’s proposal in August 2002 to Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Belarus join the Russian Federation as a member state of the federation, many analysts saw the proposal, which was roundly rejected by Lukashenka, as a way of backing Belarus into an untenable position and thereby stifling the pro-Slavic position in Belarus and Russia.²⁰⁴ Putin’s position on Belarus demonstrates that his

²⁰³ Remington, pp. 118-123.

²⁰⁴ Gregory Feifer, “Russia: In Surprise Move, Putin Backs Russia-Belarus Merger; Lukashenka

administration is neither ethnonationalist nor restorationist, rather, it is integrationalist in intent but possibly having a hegemonic and dominant outlook and practice for the “near abroad” as the nomenklatura and energy oligarchs press their monetary interests within the NIS.

Whether or not Russia is always secure in its relationship internationally is debatable. President Putin began his rule in an insecure position given the events surrounding the Chechen conflict. Disagreements over the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and NATO expansion further questioned Russian resolve. But through his deft strength assessment of his left-leaning domestic challengers, Putin has used the international incidents, especially efforts against international terrorism, to burnish his international strength and become more secure in the international realm. From Ukraine itself, Putin probably does not perceive any military, economic, or social threat. But as Ukraine disjointedly made moves toward NATO, Putin, to assuage the domestic challengers, countered Ukrainian actions by securing Russian-NATO agreements in advance, thereby reducing possible threats from the West while simultaneously disarming the “threat argument” of the domestic political opponents, mainly the restorationists, that perceive NATO expansion as a direct threat to their goals.

In thesis terms, the Putin administration is *clear-sighted* in its understanding of the threats from abroad and Ukraine. The administration is *not greedy* but because of its existing reliance upon economically vested business oligarchs, the capability to become greedy is present if the reach of the oligarchs expands without bounds. It is secure in its understanding that, if it maintains its present, though slow, course of liberalization, no foreign threats exist, especially from Ukraine. Finally, the Putin administration is somewhat institutionalized. Though nowhere near comfortable in its practices as are the West European states, the regime carried over many of the Yeltsin policies which afforded the society to experience no abrupt change in national methods nor political disorder.

D. CONCLUSION

Rebuffs Plan,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 2002. Accessed online 5 December 2002, <<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/08/15082002163736.asp>>.

Ukraine has consistently stated that it desires to adhere to the European mindset thereby divorcing itself from the legacy of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Stating a goal and actually advancing the same goal, however, become two separate matters to the Ukrainian ruling elite. Continually balancing the desires of two competitive factions within Ukraine, from those that want a clean break from the East to those that want greater interaction – if not reintegration -- with the Russian Federation, the rulers in Kiev struggle with the question of national sovereignty and the *de facto* needs of a functioning state. In addition to Ukraine's polar attitudes toward Russian integration and the resulting friction, the present government is willing to abuse state powers to strengthen its own rule. This governmental action further complicates the drive for greater Ukrainian sovereignty and strength as it forfeits the good will and support from the West.

The Russian domestic arena consists of weakly defined political parties, wherein their members gravitate toward issues concerning post-Soviet Russian influence, economic strength and prosperity, ethnonationalist unity, and sovereignty of the newly independent states. As political parties affiliate themselves with the political issues (or projects), the parties also concern themselves with other issues that overlap constituencies. Because of these overlaps, one political project will share similarities with other projects. Coalitions build between the projects, lending greater political power through greater numbers.

As Ukraine makes national and international decisions that affect the interests of the Russian political projects, Kiev must determine whether its decision will either positively or adversely affect the Russian political projects that could undermine Ukrainian strength and sovereignty. If, for purposes of its sovereignty, Ukraine must make an international decision that Kiev knows will offend the powers-that-be in Russia, Ukraine must look for methods and international forces that could ameliorate the Russian sensibilities.

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V. TWO SITUATIONS OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

A. INTRODUCTION

Conflicts, such as the Cold War, usually involve some underlying conflict of interests or ideologies. But such conflicts can also be exacerbated by misperceptions. When two states do not understand each other's actions, national decisions can be made in many spheres – economic, societal, and military -- that perpetuate reactive actions and undue threats.

As Ukraine and the Russian Federation continue to establish themselves and find their niches in the international community, economic woes and disputed sovereignty claims coupled with concerns over the status of Russian minorities continue to plague the rulers of both states. Common misperceptions, vested economic interests, and inherent biases on many conjoining issues could spell turmoil for their relations.

Since Ukraine is weaker in size, population, military strength, international status, and most other measurable factors, Kiev must tread cautiously in its attempts to garner successful outcomes on contentious issues. Past transactions between Russia and Ukraine have placed Ukrainian natural resources, economic independence, Ukrainian infrastructure, and Ukrainian nationality at risk as the Russian regional hegemonic power exerted its inherent force.

B. ECONOMIC SITUATION: ENERGY SUPPLY

1. Background

Dating back to the Soviet era, Ukraine has been heavily dependent upon Russia for most of its energy needs. Despite the heavy industrialization of Ukraine during Khrushchev's programs, the fuel to power the defense-related industries mostly came from Russia proper and other Soviet republics. Even today, Ukraine's umbilical cord is the Russian energy supply, giving domestic entities within Russia an inordinate amount of influence over Ukrainian policy. Because of a failure to make the necessary reforms, especially since the ouster of the reformist Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko in April 2001, the Ukrainian energy sector continues to be plagued by a "confusing web of tax

requirements and excessive state interference in the private sector” that has resulted in a “poor investment climate.”²⁰⁵

Despite positive signs of gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the years of 2000 and 2001 of 5.8% and 8.9% respectively, as well as “a marked drop in unemployment,” Ukraine “remains mired in a transition from a centrally-planned economic system to a market economy. While the country’s recent economic gains appear to signal that Ukraine has turned the corner, the government remains burdened by a \$12 billion foreign debt that is continuing to increase.”²⁰⁶ Throughout the years since independence, Ukraine has made halting attempts at needed economic reforms in order to successfully transition to a market economy. One of the most glaring needs of reform can be found in the energy sector. A summation of Ukraine’s natural resources and capabilities, compared to its usage, shows the degree to which Ukraine is dependent upon mainly Russian imports in its economic livelihood, at least in the short term.

a. Oil

Ukraine maintains 395 million barrels of proven oil reserves, mainly found in the eastern Dnieper-Donetsk basin, and promising exploration continues in the Sea of Azov. Despite these known reserves and a fifty-eight percent decrease of overall consumption due to the contraction of the state economy, the country still produces only twenty-five percent of its domestic needs and since its independence domestic oil production has even steadily declined in gross output.²⁰⁷ Thus, Ukraine imports approximately seventy-five percent of its oil, mainly from Russia and some from Kazakhstan.

The wild card that Ukraine has used to placate the import imbalance is its transit capabilities. Because the Druzhba pipeline traverses Ukraine from Russia westward to Slovakia and Hungary, more Russian oil flows through Ukraine to Europe and the West than what was exported through the Baltic States and Russia’s two Black

²⁰⁵ Energy Information Agency, Department of Energy, United States Government, *Ukraine Country Analysis Brief*, August 2002. Accessed online, <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ukraine.html>>.

²⁰⁶ EIA, *Ukraine Country Analysis Brief*.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

Sea ports of Novorossiisk and Tuapse, eclipsing more than 895,000 barrels in 1997.²⁰⁸ With the leftover Soviet infrastructure, Ukraine has gathered usage fees and tariffs on Russian oil. Additionally, Ukraine is attempting to further develop its export and refinement capabilities of Caspian region oil through their building of the Odesa-Brody pipeline and possible extensions into Poland while feeding off the Druzhba line. With the pipeline, Ukraine seeks to entice Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan oil exporters to bypass the crowded Bosphorus Straits and feed it their oil directly into Eastern Europe.²⁰⁹ Ukraine would hope to receive additional tariffs from the Caspian exporting states but to date, “Ukraine has not yet found any oil companies to fill the pipeline” as it struggles to gain investment, legitimately privatize the oil sector, and have an “international consortium manage the pipeline.”²¹⁰

b. Natural Gas

More indicative of Ukraine’s vital dependence upon Russian energy resources is the situation involving natural gas. Ukraine maintains 39.6 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of natural gas reserves, of which ninety-six percent of the extracted gas in 1995 came from the state-owned natural gas company – Naftohaz Ukrainy. Exploration of new sites has found some success, but it is estimated that ninety percent of the country’s biggest natural gas deposits are already exhausted. Because Ukraine is powered and heated by natural gas, the nation uses approximately 2.78 Tcf per year but only produces 272.8 billion cubic feet (Bcf). Consequently, it imports nearly eighty percent of its yearly requirement, up to 1.1 Tcf, from Russia, with the rest imported from other NIS.

Ukraine’s transit of Russian natural gas generates more consternation and disputes between the two countries than does any other economic issue. Since Russia has used the Ukrainian pipes to send nearly ninety percent of its natural gas to Europe, cash-strapped Ukraine has not let the opportunity for illegal tapping pass. In 2000, Russia charged that Ukraine illegally siphoned off gas without payment and demanded \$2 billion in debt payment. For payment, Russia offered debt cancellation for equity in the pipeline

²⁰⁸ International Trade Administration, United States Department of Commerce, *Energy in Ukraine, 2000*. Accessed online 3 December 2002, <<http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/energy/ukro&g.htm>>.

²⁰⁹ EIA, Department of Energy, United States Government, *Ukraine: Oil and Natural Gas Transit*, August 2002. Accessed online, <<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/ukratran.html#OBP>>.

²¹⁰ EIA, *Ukraine Country Analysis Brief*.

infrastructure. Ukraine “balked at the idea” and sought other sources, specifically Turkmenistan. In late 2001, a deal was reached wherein Ukraine would repay \$1.4 billion over ten years.²¹¹ Other subsequent agreements further allow Russia to lease storage sites within Ukraine.²¹²

In June 2002, President Putin, President Kuchma, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder agreed to establish an energy consortium involving the three powers that would develop and manage the future gas pipelines. The agreement establishes a ten-year transit accord that would handle Russian gas deliveries, it dramatically increases planned upgrades of Ukrainian pipes, and it holds the possibility that such an accord would stifle Russian interests in building other transit lines that would bypass Ukraine. According the United Financial Group, a Moscow-based investment firm, another facet stipulates that Gazprom, the massive Russian natural gas company, would gain “control over gas take-offs by Ukrainian consumers.” With sovereignty issues at play, Ukrainian opposition leaders, specifically former Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, could challenge the passage of the accords in the Rada.²¹³ Additionally, to avert the troubled countries of Ukraine and Belarus, Gazprom recently announced that it would construct a \$5.7 billion, 3,000-mile natural gas pipeline from the “St. Petersburg region across the Baltic Sea to Germany and then continuing on to the United Kingdom.” Integrated into the “pan-European pipeline network,” it will eventually include branches to Finland, Sweden, and Denmark.²¹⁴

Ukraine cannot allow the energy situation to continue on its current path. Desired domestic growth will stipulate the need for more fuel, whether oil, natural gas, or nuclear. Though Ukraine possibly has some untapped domestic natural resources, its present capability to tap known reserves is stunted. Because of this shortfall, Ukraine must continue to import fuel. The situation asks: From where, at what cost, and for how long?

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Jan Maksymiuk, *Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine Report*, vol. 4, no. 26, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, Prague, 2 July 2002. Accessed online <<http://www.infoukes.com/rfe-ukraine/2002/0702.html>>.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Jan Maksymiuk, “Ukraine Related News Stories from RFE,” Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty. Accessed online 5 December 2002, <<http://www.infoukes.com/rfe-ukraine/2002/1204.html>>.

2. Competitive Actions

Ukraine has the option to take competitive actions to counter Russian interests regarding Ukraine's energy imbalance. Competitive, as well as cooperative, measures taken by Ukraine will have varying impacts on the two coalitions that dominate the Russian political hierarchy. Even though some competitive actions would, on face value, be too controversial for either of the Russian coalitions, those same coalitions must also weigh the international factors as well. A competitive action could be detrimental to Russia's interests; however, the same competitive action could be viewed favorably by the West, and therefore tilt the balance in favor of Ukraine implementing such a measure as the Russian coalitions determine that western support is more important than a marginal loss toward Ukraine. Some possible competitive actions are radical in nature and could only be imagined as a possibility if Ukraine and Russia moved precipitously toward an armed confrontation with threats of military invasion.

Assessing the severity of possible adverse Russian reactions helps Ukraine determine whether or not choosing competitive actions helps strengthen its own independence and strength. Though there are a number of actions that Ukraine could choose in regards to the energy situation that are competitive in nature, the thesis identifies four different challenging acts and assesses the possible reactions by Russian interests. First, for purposes of raising much-needed revenue, Ukraine could raise tariffs or increase usage fees on the transit of Russian fuel. Second, Ukraine, for reasons of protecting its sovereignty, could outlaw the future sale of additional infrastructure to Russian entities. Another competitive action entails Ukraine, in tandem with other states of the FSU, pooling their collective resources and efforts to exploit Caspian Sea fuels without Russian participation. And finally, in a similar vein, Ukraine could seek Western investment in the extraction and refinement of Ukraine's energy resources without Russian involvement.

Reviewing the qualities of the Russian coalition consisting of integrationists, new state builders (NSB), and portions of dominators helps determine the possible reactions to Ukrainian competitive acts. All three are clear-sighted in their assessment of Ukrainian strengths and weaknesses. Their clear-sightedness allows them to understand

Ukraine's predicament in a measured manner. Both NSB and integrationists are not greedy, preferring to improve the sovereign economic position of both Russia and Ukraine through beneficial commerce and trade. However, because of their desire to have close cooperation between Russia and the "near abroad" coupled with Russia's greater size and wealth, integrationists maintain a proclivity to reach beyond the sovereign borders and thereby expand their reach. The inclusion of the obviously greedy hegemonic dominators within Russia's ruling coalition exacerbates the unintended expansionist tendencies, possibly greedy in nature, of the numerically superior integrationists. All three are secure in their knowledge that Ukraine does not pose a significant risk to the existence of the Russian state.

The opposing coalition in Russia, consisting of restorationists and ethnonationalists, are greedy in their goals to seek and expand Russian borders and strength to the detriment of Ukraine and other states of the FSU. The ethnonationalists are myopic in their appreciation of Ukraine's national needs, focusing solely on the ethnic issue and differences. The restorationists will understand Ukraine's energy issues and use those to exploit them for their own gain. However, for myopic reasons, the restorationists will not understand the negative international repercussions resulting from their exploitation or takeover of Ukrainian interests and territories. Ukrainian acts that solidify the present borders between Russia and the NIS as well as acts that continually move the economies of both Russia and Ukraine away from their socialist underpinnings toward the market model are expected to be opposed. The ethnonationalists are the only project that sees Ukraine posing a direct threat to their understanding of the Russian state in which Ukraine can take effect negative consequences upon their ethnic brethren.

a. Raise Tariffs or Increase Transit Fees

Russia's ruling coalition could appreciate Ukraine's reasons for attempting to increase its national revenue through the increase of usage fees if money gained from the same fees were appropriately spent by Ukraine to strengthen its capability to be a more successful and reliable trading partner. Obviously, any increase in fees or tariffs would need to be reasonable so as to not seriously hamper the incomes of the Russian energy oligarchs. Russia, as it continues to move toward the market economy and

international trade, needs hard currency, not Ukrainian promises of labor, and would therefore understand that Ukraine needs to raise its monetary intake. The Russian monetary requirements demand that Ukraine continues to pay off its official debts with cash as opposed to the previously common practice wherein debts were often bartered for goods and services.

The restorationists and the ethnonationalists would view a rise in tariffs as an assault upon the central power and ethnic center respectively. They would oppose the spike in usage fees as an assault on the Russian state by renegade outer states. Again, any move that raises a barrier between the center (Russia) and the strayed republics (restorationist theory) or the divided Russian race (ethnonationalist theory) will be opposed in theory, rhetoric, and often practice. Presently, the energy oligarchs and the vested nomenklatura find “conducive working conditions” under Putin’s government and the ruling coalition. Not until they are harmed economically by integrationist policy would they seek to change their present alignment in favor of the restorationists and the ethnonationalists.

b. Ban Sale of Ukrainian Assets to Russian Investors

If, for purposes of national identity and self-reliance, Ukraine were to arbitrarily ban the sale of state-owned energy infrastructure to Russia, the ruling coalition and the opposition would find fault with such policy. The only two projects that might allow for such an idea would be the NSB and the integrationists. The NSB could support such a ban due to the nomenklatura fear that continued investment into Ukraine would lead Russia back to the failed past of the Soviet Union, wherein Moscow supported the failing outer republics to the detriment of Russia. In theory, some integrationists might voice support for Ukraine’s right to establish such a policy, wherein Ukraine’s sovereignty were upheld, but since it the ban is an isolationist act, most would not support it since it hampers the trade and integration of the sovereign states. The dominators within the ruling coalition would carry the day, arguing that such a policy would infringe upon the market economy, and thereby deny the Russian oligarchs from expanding their reach. The opposition coalition would not support such a ban for the same reasons in which they would challenge the raise in usage fees.

c. Pool National Efforts With NIS Minus Russia

The integrationists and the empowered hegemonic nomenklatura would balk at any Ukrainian attempts to create *viable* economic trade zones with other states of the former Soviet Union without Russia's inclusion. In theory and practice, the integrationists require a sovereign and viable Ukraine that is economically enmeshed with Russia since Ukraine is, and will in the future, be one of Russia's largest trading partners. Efforts to impede such Russian trade with its current partners are not conducive to the integrationist spirit. The hegemons would view "Russian-excluded" trade blocs unfavorably for selfish reasons – the energy barons would lose their profits. NSB proponents could possibly welcome such non-Russian economic blocs, as liberal-minded intelligentsia would favor allowing sovereign states to do as they wish (as long as the human rights of Russians within those states were not infringed). The nomenklatura of the NSB, seeing poor states of the FSU as drains to Russia's national resources, could be indifferent to the trade blocs as long as the trade did not diminish Russian strength.

Though the restorationists would not favor a trading bloc without Russia's central authority, it could be imagined that *some* ethnonationalists could tender their support if the agreement were to focus on improving the lot of the dislocated workers, Cossacks, and the working class. But such support would be debated within the ethnonationalist camp, since the main theme of ethnonationalism is the unification of all Russians under one state, not to improve the lot of all Russians in all states.

d. Invite Western Investment without Russian Involvement

The last competitive action is very similar to the third, inviting Western governments and/or companies to establish and help direct the exploration, extraction, transport, refinement, marketing and/or any combination of the five practices of Ukraine energy industry. Without including the Russian Federation and its energy industry, such an act by Ukraine would be drastic in scope; it would suggest Ukraine is embarking on a path with clear intentions of trying to cut the economic umbilical cord between the two states. Ukraine's present condition does not provide a climate that is beneficial for Western investment. If Kiev has any grand designs of instituting a Western investment plan, it must first take the difficult steps of passing, instituting, and obeying a vast number of internal reforms in order to make the nation economically attractive. The

West should not expect to see any investment plans solidified until after the 2004 presidential election.

Assessing the reactions of an energy investment plan that excludes Russia, the ruling Russian coalition and the opposition would summarily reject such a plan. Besides the most liberal intelligentsia of the NSB, no other project could possibly support extensive Western involvement in Ukraine without Russia's inclusion. However, because the Russian Federation is also only twelve years old, it is still developing a number of its institutions and attitudes. Still new to the market place, Russia and its ruling coalition are not economically strong enough to ignore Western economic influences. In order for Russia to become economically stronger and its democratic processes to become more institutionalized, Russia's ruling coalition (integrationists, New State Builders, and the business oligarchs) will require patience, assistance, and continued nurturing by the West. They cannot turn their back on Western interests and ignore investment entrepreneurs until the Russian Federation is capable of standing on its own. The ruling coalition also knows that there are still unreformed socialists waiting in the restorationist camp that would enthusiastically attempt to undue many of the democratizing reforms since 1991. The business oligarchs must understand this conundrum as well, thus, the Russian energy oligarchs, who would be the ones that lose the most if Ukraine were to adopt the Western investment plan, would need to temper their curt reactions and attempt to wangle the best deal possible.

What choices are better for Ukraine security? The author of the thesis believes that choices that unnecessarily increase the hostility of the Russian reaction are worse than those that alleviate such a risk. In this light, weighing the projects' reactions to the proposals, the worst competitive option for Ukraine in addressing its energy situation is for Ukraine to choose the ban on Russian investment. It would generate the angst from most projects while garnering the support of only the NSB. The second worst choice is the "trade with NIS without Russia." Again the NSB supports this act and are joined by a few ethnonationalists; all other projects reject this option. The third worst choice is the "Western investment without Russia." In this option the only support would be from some oligarchs within the hegemon. Depending upon the strength of oligarch influence within the ruling coalition could be the determinant factor upon Ukraine's

decision. The least antagonizing option would be to marginally raise tariffs and usage fees, as all three projects within the ruling coalition could support some aspects of the rate hike.

Whether or not a marginal rate increase would be enough to help Ukraine modernize its infrastructure and eliminate its debt crisis would need to be studied. If not, Ukraine might need to consider a less favorable competitive action, such as the “Western investment without Russia” or look at cooperative options.

3. Cooperative Actions

Just as the Ukrainian energy situation could give rise to competitive actions, the same situation also permits cooperative measures that could alleviate Russian domestic concerns. But just as competitive acts can heighten Russian insecurity, cooperative acts, if applied incorrectly, could weaken Ukraine’s security thereby sending greedy Russian entities the message that Ukraine is weak and not determined in her own defense. Additionally, because Kuchma and his regime are domestically weak, both the democratic institutions and more importantly to Kuchma, his rule, are challenged by growing domestic protests for reform. Thus, Kuchma must ensure that economic policies are balanced and do not tip too far in Russia’s favor. The thesis offers three cooperative actions that Ukraine can take. Ukraine could seek agreements that offer improvements of Ukrainian infrastructure by Russian energy companies that could lead to greater transit of Russian fuels. Another cooperative measure would be to promote trade exclusively with Russia and within the CIS. And still another cooperative act would promote Western investment jointly with Russian interests.

a. Russian Improvements of Ukrainian Infrastructure

If Ukraine were to approach Russia with the proposal that the Russian government or the Russian energy consortiums assume a larger role in the improvement, enlargement, maintenance, administration and use of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, there would not be too much disagreement from Moscow. Possibly the only dissenting voices would be from the NSB intelligentsia who want to avoid weakening Ukrainian sovereignty and very few elites within the integrationalist camp that do not want to subsidize possible external failures.

The major dissension that would greet Kiev would come from the nationalist elements in western Ukraine and also from the liberal reformists who would justifiably claim that Kiev was exposing Ukraine to Russian intrusions. The amount of de facto control that Ukraine was willing to offer Russia would determine the amount of support or lack thereof from the West and the United States. Beyond fears of Russia capitalizing upon Ukrainian economic insecurity and assuming control of Ukrainian industry without firing a shot, the United States and Europe could also fear the resurgence of imperial intentions from Russia. This “imperial phobia” may be immature, however, Ukraine could possibly use this fear against the West and subtly blackmail the United States and Europe for more financial support.

b. Agree to Heavier Economic Integration Within the CIS

Another cooperative act that Ukraine could take would be to join the fledgling Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC),²¹⁵ even though the organization favors Russian interests. Throughout the existence of the CIS, Ukraine has rebuffed efforts to formally align itself with the economies of many CIS states. In a conciliatory manner toward Russia, Ukraine could agree to become more heavily invested with the East as opposed to following its stated goals of eventually acquiring membership within the European Union.²¹⁶

A Ukrainian decision to join the EAEC would drastically shake the alliances of the Russian political projects. The NSB would probably continue to be against such a union, fearing the eventual reemergence of the failed Soviet policies, especially when several states within the EAEC continue to flirt with the centrally controlled economic model. Also possibly coming out against such a measure would be

²¹⁵ Much along the same lines of the European Union, in October 2000, “the leaders of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tadjikistan met in Astana, Kazakhstan to negotiate and sign a document establishing the Eurasian Economic Union. This newly formed international organization is intended to solve the problems of external trade and customs policies by establishing common trade laws on goods and services. The new payment system and new single order of currency control and regulation is hoped to be more effective than its Customs Union predecessor which did not lead to the successful and effective economic integration of its members.” Maria Utyaganova, International Relations Department, American University-Kyrgyzstan. *The Analyst*, 2000. Accessed online, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/October_25/Eurasian_Economic_Union.htm>.

²¹⁶ “Moscow Differs with Kyiv’s European Choice,” *Monitor*, vol 8, issue 93, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 29 April 2002. Accessed online, <http://russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon_008_083_000.htm>.

the ethnonationalists, who do not favor tying the economic health of ethnic Russian to the possibility of economic failures on non-Russian populations and countries of the southern regions of the Soviet empire. Another project that could frown upon Ukrainian EAEC membership is the economically vested nomenklatura that would experience negative repercussions from western markets and nations. Over time, if a reemergence of an economic model resembling that of the Soviet Union that could lead to military cooperation among the member states occurs, the West would reestablish trade barriers and embargoes as a logical first step. Such measures would inevitably impact heavily upon the business leaders who use the current economic structures to their advantage.

Russian proponents for a pro-EAEC Ukrainian decision would be the integrationists, as long as the sovereignty of the states were not marginalized. They would jump for joy and declare a national holiday for their major objective -- the economic reintegration of sovereign states -- would have been realized. The restorationists would view the EAEC membership as a logical first step toward economic and possibly military integration. Stretching the importance of Ukrainian EAEC membership, the restorationists might also see the decision as an indicator that Ukrainian is not wholly averse to the restoration idea.

Most opposition parties within Ukraine would also be against such an inclusion except for the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine. The center-right party under Viktor Tushchenko, reformist Yulia Tymenshenko's Bloc, and most of the business oligarchs supporting Kuchma's regime would also be opposed to Ukraine abandoning its long-professed desire to join Europe by joining the EAEC.

c. Promote Western Investment Coupled With Russian Interests

A final cooperative measure that could find favor with most parties would invite both the West and Russia to invest in the upgrade and improvement of Ukrainian infrastructure. In the event that Ukraine passes the needed internal reforms to improve its investment climate, Europe and the United States would welcome the opportunity to make Ukraine stronger to avert future Russian imperialism but also to open new energy fields and improve existing export facilities.

Obvious Russian proponents of a joint investment program would include the NSB, the integrationists, and the energy oligarchs -- who would gain greater technology and access to the world market. The ethnonationalist sentiment could possibly favor a joint venture since it would improve the economic standing of many Russians in eastern Ukraine as well as other dislocated workers in Russia. The ethnonationalists would first need to be assured that any deal would not stifle their long-term goals of joining the Russian people under one state.

Any and all projects that favor a return to the imperial state would, at first blush, oppose such an adventure. Thus, the restorationists and the dominators who maintain an imperial bent would need to be persuaded to sign on. Such persuasions could be written time-restricted leases that guarantee that the West companies will not remain on Ukrainian soil beyond an agreed point unless further amended. It is assumed that all unreformed communists and radical imperialists in Russia and Ukraine would not favor such a trilateral endeavor, viewing such action as an assault upon the sovereignty of their states.

4. Energy Supply Recommendations

Weighing the Russian projects, the worst cooperative measure that Ukraine could take would be joining the EAEC, as the NSB could eventually be joined by the hegemon and the ethnonationalists. The second worst aggravating option is the Western investment coupled with Russian interests, to which the ethnonationalists and the restorationists, fearing Western influences, would object. The Russian projects would obviously prefer the option that allows for Russian investment through out the Ukrainian energy sector. As previously stated, the main opposition would come from domestic interests within Ukraine; opposition reformists demanding western investment while the communists preferring the Russian investment plan and the decision to join the EAEC.

Ukraine will need to improve the output and efficiency of its energy industry. Such improvements will require investment from other states or an increase of profits from existing sales. The author of the thesis believes that the competitive options do not offer a guaranteed rise in profits nor do the competitive options calm the fears of the Russian ruling elite who are more influential in Ukraine today than other potential

investment states. The competitive choices risk endangering the interests of Ukraine. Some cooperative measures also endanger Ukrainian security as possibly too much is surrendered to Russian interests or those multi-national interests that are heavily influenced by Russian interests (EAEC). The cooperative measure of inviting Western investment along with Russian interests and improvements is the best option since it undercuts the Russian antagonists by mollifying the disenfranchised populations. It also benefits the ruling coalitions of Russia. The determining factor to this plan is whether or not the Ukrainian government is willing to make Ukraine the European state that it desires to be.

C. STRENGTHENING THE UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN BORDER

1. Present Status

Since 1991, Ukraine has continually voiced the desire to be a European state and eventually accede to European Union (EU). Failure to make the necessary domestic reforms along with Russian pressures have sometimes forced Ukraine to be silent about its desire for EU membership, for example during the March 2002 parliamentary elections.²¹⁷ These problems have delayed Ukraine's goal of European assimilation.

One of the stipulations of EU membership is the capability of member states to control their external borders in efforts to "plan for legal migration while combating illegal migration and trafficking in human beings. Border management will take on increased importance with close co-operation in areas ranging from customs and veterinary/phyto-sanitary controls²¹⁸ to combating organized crime and drugs trafficking."²¹⁹ If Ukraine is to eventually make inroads toward EU membership, it must establish and control its external borders with non-EU states, which includes the Russian Federation. To this end, Ukraine would need to establish control facilities and access points, along with the required personnel to enforce the policies, thereby limiting the flow of goods, services, and people between Ukraine and Russia.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ All measures, regulations, and laws dealing with the transport and packaging of animals and plants.

²¹⁹ European Union, "Enlargement 2001." Accessed online 9 December 2002, <<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/>>.

In 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership that, upon ratification in 1999, formalized Russia's recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Coupled with the 1997 Black Sea Fleet Accords, the two states moved the Ukrainian sovereignty issue past a diplomatic stalemate and placed it on a path where Russia and Ukraine have different interpretations of how that sovereignty can be expressed on the ground. Russia has agreed to delimitation of the border on topographic maps; Ukraine wants to demarcate the line so that it is readily identifiable on the ground.

In April 2002 Russian First Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Valery Loshchinin, who coordinates Russia's relations within the CIS, stated, "Russia takes a consistent stand against demarcating the border with Ukraine" since such an act would interfere with the cultural, economic, and personal contacts derived from "traditional" Russia-Ukrainian relations. He further stipulated, "Only hotheads would want to erect border obstacles, fences, and ditches along our mutual border," thereby implying such ideas were simply nationalistic fervor and were contemporaneous with an outdated Soviet-type border.²²⁰

In response, Ukrainian Deputy State Secretary Volodymyr Yelchenko expressed the opinion that "demarcated borders are legally indispensable between sovereign countries and underscored that demarcating Ukraine's eastern borders, and securing them against illegal traffic of all types, constitutes a prerequisite to Ukraine's integration with the EU."²²¹ If Ukraine wants to gain EU membership, it will need to address the contentious border issue; Ukraine can address the issue in either a competitive or cooperative manner, each having different reactions from the different political projects within Russia.

2. Competitive Actions

If Ukraine joins the European Union, it must establish control over its international borders with states that are not EU members – it would have no choice. Having a line on a map does not stop illicit trade and illegal immigration nor would it

²²⁰ "Moscow Differs with Kyiv's European Choice," *Monitor*, vol 8, issue 93.

²²¹ Ibid.

control legal access across a 2,000-kilometer stretch of land. The only known capability of doing so is to channel persons and goods through a number of well-controlled points and to deny entry through all the rest. Denying entry to the remaining expanses requires walls, fences, surveillance, or a combination of all three. The act of erecting a border between two sovereign states can be construed as a competitive act. For this argument, it is not; rather, the act of erecting the border is a foregone conclusion. Thus, the thesis asks, are there competitive acts or cooperative acts that Ukraine can do that would either exacerbate or ameliorate Russian concerns?

a. Ukraine Deploys Armed Forces to Establish and Control Border

A competitive action that could exacerbate Russian political projects would be if Ukraine, to help establish the border, deployed members of its armed forces to assist in the command and control or everyday functions of the border. If Ukraine were to deploy military units as complete entities to assist in the construct or operation, the act itself could be misperceived by some Russian interests and purposefully distorted for political gain by other Russian players. In the event an infantry unit, whether battalion, brigade, or regiment, was deployed from Kiev to the border with the sole purpose of assisting in checkpoint control, restorationists could purposely raise fears in Russia that Ukraine is taking unnecessary hostile acts in attempts to stir the masses. In order to avert the restorationist fear, Ukraine, if needing the personnel from the military, should transfer those persons away from the military unit and to the official border/customs bureaus of the government.

The restorationists and the ethnonationalists would be solidly against any border construction no matter how the Ukrainians manned the checkpoints. The NSB project would support the border project in spirit and action; the integrationists would in theory support the demarcated border since they espouse the inviolability of border sovereignty, however, they would need assurance that promotion of trade within Ukraine and Russia and other CIS states would not suffer.

The business barons of the hegemonic dominators, depending upon the legality of their trade, would fall on either side of the wall. If Ukraine were to run an honest operation on the border and snuff out the smuggling, the honest businesses would

support the measures; the dishonest barons would find fault with the border and either attempt to subvert the border, or change their business practices. If corruption infiltrated the Ukrainian endeavor, the Russian business oligarchs would act in the reverse.

b. Ukraine Invites Strong Third Party to Assist on Border

Another competitive measure that Ukraine could employ to help establish their eastern border would be to ask for the assistance of a major power. If Ukraine were to request help in the construction or ask for monetary assistance, some of the same reactions of the Russian political projects as listed above would apply. However, Ukraine must realize that inviting a foreign power in onto Ukrainian soil will exacerbate the vitriol of the restorationists and the ethnonationalists. If the restorationists and ethnonationalists were successful in their efforts to create an undue hysteria about “Ukrainian militarization of the border,” Ukraine would be posed with an escalatory situation that could challenge Ukraine’s resolve. Ukraine would then be required to acquiesce or to respond with determination. Ukraine must prevent this unintended consequence. Ukraine should, in advance of any border construction, coordinate with the ruling elites (presently integrationists, NSB, and business nomenklatura) and the West (Europe and the United States) in order to assuage their main concerns.

Rank ordering the two competitive options determines that the second option is the worst of the two since it gives the ethnonationalists and the restorationists more reasons to object to the demarcated border than the first one. By introducing a third power to the equation, sovereignty issues would be exacerbated beyond the bi-lateral discussion. The foreign force introduction could give the ethnonationalists and restorationists additional arguments, fostering fears of a “foreign power occupation” in and on the Russian border. Unless Russian forces imminently threaten Ukraine, the second option offers no clear advantage over the first. In fact, it could make the bilateral relations worse and thereby threaten the Ukrainian security since such a decision amplifies the myopic insecurity of the substantial and vocal minority of the Russian population, with no apparent gain.

3. Cooperative Actions

As Ukraine determines applicable methods of constructing and manning an effective border between Russia and itself, it could look for methods that would diffuse the vocal opposition in Russia. If Ukraine cannot persuade the Russian opposition to agree with the need for the border, possibly Ukraine could look for ways of strengthening both the Russian supporters' claims (NSB and integrationists) and also the positions of those that could be swayed to accept the border (business oligarchs). Stating the obvious, Ukraine must establish effective liaisons with the Russian proponents, always ready to diffuse any potential rift with the Russian ruling elite.

a. Ukraine Makes Concessions on Other Issues

A cooperative measure to lessen the strife within Russia would be to make conciliatory concessions upon other issues that both Ukraine and Russia hold dear. As Ukraine prioritizes its economic needs, if EU membership ranks first, then the promotion and construction of the border must rank first as well. Thus, other issues that divide Ukraine and Russia slip a spot and become second order. One issue that could be slip to second is the status of the Sea of Azov. With the 1997 Black Sea Fleet and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, the disposition of control the sea remains unsettled. Ukraine could offer, in return for less consternation concerning the border, that Russia could have unfettered access to the sea through the Straits of Kerch. Or another issue could have Ukraine granting an extension to the leases that Russia has within the port of Sevastopol.

It should be expected that any border between Ukraine and Russia would never be accepted by the ethnonationalists. For them to do so destroys their reason for existence. The restorationists are, by constitution, more understanding of Ukraine's needs. Their argument against the establishment of the border rests upon the desire to restore the either the imperial boundaries or the boundaries of the Soviet Union. The argument can be made that gaining and keeping unencumbered Black Sea access was of major import to the empire. Applying such inducements to the heretofore anti-border restorationists, Ukraine could parlay this strategic need of the Russian Federation with their support for the Ukrainian border.

b. Ukraine Garner Support From West to Appease Russia

In the same manner that Ukraine could facilitate Russian reactions to the international border by making concessions to the restorationists, Ukraine, through diplomatic and economic channels could explore ways of bringing Russia along with itself to the West. Ukraine could try to persuade the West to increase economic aid to Russia through the following argument: Ukraine wants a border, Russia wants more Western investment, the West wants an independent and viable Ukraine, so Ukraine tells the West to invest more in Russia and Russia agrees to allow the border to be built.

Once again, the ethnonationalists will balk at the existence of any demarcated border. The restorationist movement, consisting of communists, urbanites, displaced military personnel, and the state security agencies, need more money coming into the country so as to support their own organizations. The West is one of the few places where such an amount of cash exists. With other regions within the world simmering with unrest and uncertainty, Russia's natural wealth and energy resources provide realistic alternatives for the industrial and entrepreneurial West. If the ruling coalition in Russia engaged the West in such an inviting manner, the result could possibly divide the restorationist project by sifting the unreformed communists from the disenfranchised masses. Additionally, Western economic inducements, coupled with continual internal social and political reforms, could improve the economic and social situation within the Russian Federation and thus improve the popularity of the ruling elite.

The two cooperative options will have similar reactions and repercussions from the Russian projects. The ruling coalition would support both measures, with the "Western support" option tallying greater approval from the business oligarchs since the Western investments could give them a financial windfall. But since the oligarchs will improve their status in each scenario, the better cooperative option for Ukraine would be the one that brings along the most restorationists. The "trade-off" option readily gives tangible results to the restorationists. The "Western support" option would require time for the business growth and wealth generation to result in an improved economic condition of the restorationists' supporters. Each option has its positives and negatives. Both options would diminish the misperceptions of Russian actors. However, the "trade-off" option could result in Ukrainian domestic strife as Ukrainian nationalists could

bitterly protest the surrender of Ukrainian property. The thesis thereby proposes that Ukraine explores the “Western investment” option as possibility to achieve a demarcated border.

4. Border Recommendations

If Ukraine moves toward European inclusion, it will have to demarcate its border with Russia. Reviewing the two competitive options against the two cooperative options determines that Ukraine would reduce Russian concerns by incorporating the cooperative “Western investment” option over the others. The worst option for Ukraine is the competitive “third power invite,” since it would fan the flames of the Russian opposition while rendering no improved capability over the other options. Ukraine could, with Russian coordination in advance, use instances of the remaining two options – the competitive “Ukrainian troops for border duty” and the cooperative “trade-off” -- to decrease the aversion from Russian coalitions.

D. CONCLUSION

Two of the most pressing problems that confront Ukraine today are its energy dependency on Russia and, if it intends to gain European Union admittance, its requirement to physically strengthen its eastern border with Russia.

Strictly competitive measures concerning the energy problems and debts could needlessly aggravate Russian political projects and could result in a negative backlash against Ukrainian economic interests. Some isolated competitive measures, such as a reasonable transit fee increase, could be accepted by Russia, however, if certain Russian projects determine that the Ukrainian financial profits were appropriately used. Other more competitive measures, wherein Russian energy interests were placed at a distinct disadvantage, would not be beneficial to Ukraine’s economic strength since most Russian political projects would reject the Ukrainian acts. Ukrainian decisions to align with other states within the NIS or with Western powers to help improve the infrastructure and export capability, entirely at Russia’s expense, should be avoided.

Cooperative measures that expose Ukraine’s long-term economic strength solely to Russian interests also should be avoided. Since Russia already holds great sway over Ukraine’s economic prosperity, measures, such as bilateral agreements to exchange

Ukrainian debt for ownership of Ukrainian infrastructure, further enhance Russian domination over the Ukrainian energy sector. Multilateral agreements with Western powers are preferred. Measures that also guarantee assistance to Russian energy development and exports provide for Russian economic gain without infringing upon Ukrainian sovereignty.

Competitive measures concerning Ukraine's need to establish a demarcated eastern border must be avoided. The present and future capability of Ukraine's military, when compared to Russia's, plus Ukraine's geographic proximity place Ukraine at a disadvantage that cannot be resolved with confrontational acts.

Because the border must be demarcated – a confrontational act to some very vocal Russian interests - Ukraine must find cooperative ways to do so that will appeal to the majority of influential Russians. The thesis offers an idea in which Ukraine, prioritizing its needs, concedes to Russian interests on matters of less importance. Through a decision, such as surrendering “sovereignty” claims over the disputed Sea of Azov, Ukraine might be able to gain Russian consent for the required border demarcation.

Multiple issues integrate Ukraine and Russia. Two of these issues are the Ukrainian energy dependence upon Russia and the need for Ukraine to demarcate its common border with Russia. The thesis, using its constructed framework, determines that the best way for Ukraine to approach the two issues is the cooperative approach that infuses the support of Western nations. It is noted that no decision on any matter between Ukraine and Russia -- especially these two -- will garner full support of all domestic actors. But much like a functioning democracy, give-and-take is required to achieve consensus and as long as the achieved consensus does not damage the security and economic strength of Ukraine, the consensus should suffice.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Ukraine and Russia have a number of issues that cause grave concern between the political players and coalitions of each state. Ever since the southwestward expansion of the Russian Empire, their Slavic brethren to the north have dominated the Ukrainian people. Ukraine is at a comparative disadvantage to Russia in many matters including natural resources, military strength, international influence, and post-Soviet market reforms.

Ukraine must decide upon a national path for its future; if it chooses to gain entry into Europe, the country will need many painful but necessary internal reforms and national decisions which, if successfully implemented, could cause the present ruling elite to lose their hold while antagonizing several Russian domestic factions. If Ukraine chooses to stay on its current path of vacillation and not make a decisive move to the East or the West, it runs the risks of ostracizing itself from the international economic engines that are needed for it to improve the livelihood of its citizens. If Ukraine decides to align itself with Russia, the states of the former Soviet Union, or a combination of the two, Ukraine could again find itself overwhelmed by Russian patronage – a condition dreaded by many individuals throughout Ukraine and the West.

The author of this thesis believes that the Ukrainian people and their leaders will eventually choose the first option and endeavor to align the nation with the West, not so much for ideological affinity or determined dislike of their Russian brethren, but rather out of economic and social necessity. Ukraine must expand its productivity and develop its natural wealth in order to continue to function as a participating state within the international community. Its geo-strategic location, being the crossroads between South Asia and Europe, demands the attention of the Western powers. When Ukraine decides to exploit its unique position – choosing a European path and implementing the necessary reforms, the West, with patience, understanding, and wealth, will readily assist Ukraine in its decision.

As Ukraine implements its decision to align with the West, the decision will invariably irritate the interests of both Ukrainians and Russians who would prefer to not see Ukraine, nor the Russian Federation for that matter, accept Western ideals and practices. Within Russia, economic hardships resulting from their ongoing economic reforms, coupled with nostalgic thoughts of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, provide a vocal and influential sector of society that can influence the fragile political situation in Russia and, hence, the Russian stance toward Ukraine. The coalitions within Russia that will oppose the Ukrainian actions will not disappear nor cease to exist in the near future. Because of their influence within Russia, Ukraine must factor their power into how Ukraine implements its required reforms.

The Ukrainian acts can be either competitive or cooperative in nature as viewed by the Russians. Ukrainian acts that present no gain whatsoever to interests or opinions of the Russian domestic players or severely inhibit the Russian goals are competitive. If the offended parties are influential enough, Ukrainian interests and goals can be affected and even stopped. If Ukraine decides to not take competitive actions to meet its national goals, preferring to placate the Russian dissenters, the Ukrainian acts could overcompensate for the Russian interests to such a degree that the Ukrainian goals cannot be met. Additionally, upon seeing the lack of Ukrainian resolve to implement its national goals, dominant Russians could view the Ukrainian decision as a weakness that could be challenged again, thereby continuing to threaten Ukrainian sovereignty.

The thesis constructed a theoretical framework derived from the earlier works of two defensive realists: Charles Glaser and Jack Snyder. The framework determines that the actions of Ukraine will have resonating effects upon different Russian political players, or projects. The projects are identified as to their particular understanding of the Russian Diaspora within the newly independent states following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Some projects demand the reunion of all Russians while other projects prefer to successfully build the Russian state, simultaneously recognizing the sovereignty of the others. For political power, the Russian projects have coalesced into functioning coalitions. By identifying each project's political strength as well as its coalition's weakness, Ukraine can choose policies and execute actions, whether competitive or cooperative, that can divide the Russian opposition and diminish their influence.

Concurrently, Ukraine must also identify the Russian projects and coalitions that are supportive of Ukrainian sovereignty and tailor their decisions to bolster the political strength of the beneficial Russian actors.

The framework incorporated the positive or negative effects that certain international factors have upon the ability of a government to realize their chosen policies. The thesis determined that the Western powers would be concerned and extremely interested with results of the Ukrainian-Russian situation. Because of the West's concern, Ukraine and Russia could expect to receive inducements that would favor their positive actions. Likewise the West would respond with negative warnings if the two countries chose to take actions contrary to Western interests. One of the major benchmarks determining the amount of inducements would be the extent of liberalization throughout the country in contrast to imperial policies. If Russia were to revert to previous dominating tendencies that would threaten the sovereignty of the NIS, the West would withdraw their economic inducements. The final international factor affecting the regimes in Ukraine and Russia is the extent of the institutionalization of liberalizing reforms. Since independence for both states is still relatively new, the reforms measures are still weak in practice and adherence. The West would promote those policies and decisions that strengthen Ukrainian and Russian liberalization while understanding that repetitive practice, steady and patient leadership, and the passage of time are needed to institutionalize the required democratic and market reforms.

The thesis states that Ukraine must recognize that its actions will have consequences for the domestic political entities within Russia. Some of those entities have designs that threaten Ukraine's sovereignty while other Russian entities willingly promote (or at least are silent upon the issue of) Ukraine's independence. Because of Ukraine's importance, the West, led by the United States, could readily assist Ukraine in their interaction with Russia, but only if Ukraine firmly displays its desire, through policy and action, to become a liberalized state. To this end, the United States should prepare to support those Ukrainian domestic political entities that are willing to reform the state along liberal ideals.

Using the constructed framework and assessing two contentious issues that severely divide Russian and Ukrainian domestic actors, the author of the thesis concludes that Ukraine, fully informing Russia of its intentions, must take a cooperative act to improve the energy supply situation by inviting Western investment along with Russian interests to improve Ukrainian efficiency and output. This measure is the best option because it isolates the ethnonationalists into a smaller minority as it diminishes support for the Russian integrationalist argument. The integrationalist argument loses public support as the disenfranchised populations common lot is improved.

The thesis also determines that Ukraine should seek Western investment within Russia as an incentive for Russia to agree to border demarcation. Through growth and improved economic standing as the result of greater Western investment, the integrationalist support would be marginalized. Improved living standards for the disenfranchised common Russian would undercut his or her support for the restorationist mantra. No longer would ordinary Russian long for the restoration of the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire as the elixir to their troubled everyday existence.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In the construct of the thesis and its identification of the Russian political projects, the Russian players were identified and collated according to their appreciation of the Russian minorities dispersed throughout the former states of the Soviet Union. However, not all influential political individuals and players have an expressed opinion about the diaspora, at least not as the reason for their existence. Further research could assess the wants and desires, outside of opinions regarding Russian minorities, of other Russian interests and what are their reasons for or against Ukrainian sovereignty. As the thesis determined coalitions according to how the different Russian projects approached the diaspora, another line of research could explore another issue that is readily affected by Ukrainian sovereignty. For example, continued Ukrainian strength could adversely affect the capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex. If sovereignty issues emanating from the NIS threaten the strength of the military-industrial complex, different sectors of the Russian society will coalesce around their own particular views concerning the threats and promote or reject Ukrainian measures accordingly.

By exploring other national issues that impact the Russian sensibilities using the theoretical framework of this thesis, further research could help Ukraine and the Western powers predict the positive and negative repercussions of their actions. Those that support the sovereignty of liberalizing nations while minimizing the power of imperial forces within the Russian Federation can be identified and implemented. Those actions that fail to secure Ukrainian sovereignty because the actions needlessly inflame the strong opponents of Ukrainian independence, without offering a reasonable alternative, can also be identified and avoided.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALCM	Air-Launched Cruise Missile
Bcf	Billion Cubic Feet
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CP(b)U	Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Ukraine
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
EAEC	Eurasian Economic Community
EU	European Union
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP	New Economic Plan
NIS	Newly Independent States
NSB	New State Builders
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
Tcf	Trillion Cubic Feet
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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